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ABSTRACT

Labor abuses in China have drawn international condemnation
and led to increasing domestic unrest. Government, business and
unions in the United States have insisted that Chinese law needs to
be reformed to deal with those abuses but they fail to identify
precisely what reforms are required.

This article aims to shift debates about reforming Chinese labor
law in the United States to a much greater level of specificity. The
discussion focuses on two very prevalent abuses that are
purportedly prohibited by existing labor regulation: underpayment
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of wages and excessive working hours. The article analyses in
detail those aspects of China’s labor laws and labor institutions
contributing to pervasive non-compliance. I find that the Chinese
regulatory framework is undermined by a profusion of imprecise
and sometimes contradictory legal rules, a bureaucratic ‘command
and control’ approach to inspection and dispute resolution, and a
narrow and ineffective range of tools for inducing compliance.

Drawing on successful international examples of regulatory
innovation, as well as recent creative Chinese experiments in labor
enforcement, I propose a range of regulatory initiatives that have
realistic prospects of inducing greater adherence to the law in
China’s current political and economic context.
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I. INTRODUCTION
China’s extraordinary economic success is marred by widespread
labor abuses, epitomized by the manufacturing sweatshop staffed
by ill-treated workers migrating from China’s hinterland.2 Many
kinds of abuse occur in apparent defiance of Chinese labor law.
Firms breach labor contracts and wage regulations by underpaying
2 See ANITA CHAN, CHINA'S WORKERS UNDER ASSAULT: THE EXPLOITATION OF
LABOR IN A GLOBALIZING ECONOMY (2001); KAI-MING LIU & SHEN TAN,
KUAGUO GONGSI DE SHEHUI ZEREN YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [Corporate
Social Responsibility in China] (2003); STEPHEN FROST, WORKERS' RIGHTS
FOR THE NEW CENTURY 16-36

(2002).
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their employees for work performed, or not paying them at all.
They violate legal provisions on working hours by requiring staff to
work for extreme periods of time without rest. They ignore health
and safety law by operating egregiously dangerous workplaces.

In the United States, the Congressional-Executive Commission on
China,3 the United States Council for International Business
4

(USCIB) and Human Rights Watch,5 among other organizations,
have all highlighted China’s systemic inability to enforce its labor

3 The Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) was established
by Congress in the U.S.-China Relations Act 2000 (22 U.S.C. Chapter 77
Subchapter II). The CECC monitors human rights and the development of the
rule of law in China. It consists of nine Senators, nine members of the House
of Representatives and five

Administration officials appointed by the

President. See, e.g. the CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA,
ANNUAL REPORT 36-43 (2005).
4 Business Letter from United States Council for International Business to
President Bush on AFL-CIO China Trade Complaint (Apr. 7, 2004) available
at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?DocumentID=2864.
5 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT, 247 (2006).
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law and the detrimental effect this has on Chinese workers. The
American labor movement has gone further. The movement’s
largest peak body, the AFL-CIO, has claimed that China is not only
failing to protect its own citizens, it is wrongfully causing major
economic damage to the United States. The AFL-CIO argues that
Chinese employers are undercutting competitors (including
American competitors) by reducing labor costs far below the level
that would prevail in China if the law was properly implemented.

On the basis of this argument, the AFL-CIO petitioned the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) in 2004 to initiate an
investigation under Section 301 of the Trade Act.6 The petition set
out in detail a range of labor abuses and then, using various
6 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (2000). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as amended)
authorizes the United States Trade Representative to impose trade sanctions
against countries that ‘burden or restrict’ U.S. commerce by engaging in
unreasonable trade practices. Unreasonable trade practices are defined to
include ‘a persistent pattern of conduct that … fails to provide standards for
minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health of
workers.’: id § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(iii).

6

economic models, claimed that China’s unfair cost advantage over
US manufacturing had led to the displacement of some 727,000
jobs.7 The AFL-CIO sought remedies including the imposition of
trade sanctions commensurate with the cost advantage caused by
the labor abuses.

8

The AFL-CIO’s petition was opposed by USCIB and rejected by
the USTR on the basis that the imposition of sanctions was
counterproductive and would have disastrous domestic economic

7 See Section 301 Petition of American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations, (U.S. Trade Representative), filed with the United
States Trade Representative on Mar. 16, 2004, available at
http://www.aflcio.org/issuespolitics/globaleconomy/upload/china_ petition.pdf.
The petition is discussed in Developments in the Law -- Jobs and Borders: III.
Legal Tools for Altering Labor Conditions Abroad 118 HARV. L. REV. 2202,
2216-2217.
8 Business Letter from United States Council for International Business to
President Bush on AFL-CIO China Trade Complaint (Apr. 7, 2004) available
at http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?DocumentID=2864.
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consequences.

9

Both maintained that the preferable path to

improving labor conditions in China was, in the USCIB’s words,
‘increasing economic and non-economic engagement’.10 The merits
of the AFL-CIO’s claims about the economic effects of Chinese
labor abuses were not subject to rigorous investigation and the
matter remains unresolved.

Irrespective of whether the United States should best respond to
China’s labor abuses through engagement or through the imposition

9 Rejected by the Office of the United States Trade Representative on Apr. 28th
2004: 69 Fed.Reg. 26204-5 (2004).The USTR stated that ‘the initiation of an
investigation […] would not further Administration efforts to improve
workers’ rights in China and, to the contrary, that initiation would instead
hamper those efforts’: id at 26205.
10 Shortly after the AFL-CIO’s petition was rejected, the U.S. and China signed
four Joint Letters of Understanding for cooperation between American and
Chinese agencies in relation to labor issues, including enforcement of wage
and hours regulation and workplace safety laws. US Department of Labor
The U.S. Department of Labor and The People’s Republic of China Sign Four
Joint Letters of Understanding (Press Release, Jun. 21, 2004).
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of trade sanctions, a comprehensive analysis of the deficiencies of
Chinese legal framework is a prerequisite to generating concrete
reform proposals and demands. Unfortunately, advocates of both
the engagement and sanctions approaches have operated at a level
of generality that makes it difficult to implement or evaluate a
practical strategy for improving labor conditions in China. It is not
adequate to refer vaguely to improving human rights and the rule of
law; if a co-operative approach is to be adopted, precisely which
aspects of China’s labor law framework should be a priority for
international collaboration? How do we assess whether the
cooperation has yielded any tangible benefits? Alternatively, if
sanctions are to be threatened, what precise demands are to be
made of China? No legal system can achieve perfect compliance,
let alone one in a developing country. What then is it reasonable to
insist that China do?

Moreover, neither approach sufficiently acknowledges the extent of
labor law reform now underway in China, perhaps because much of
this reform is occurring at a decentralized level. The domestic

9

pressure for reform is powerful and increasing. Workers dissatisfied
with the lack of remedies for their mistreatment are resorting ever
more frequently to self-help measures such as spontaneous protests,
many of which turn violent.11 These events are sufficiently serious
to induce government officials and labor law scholars to develop an
array of proposals for improving law enforcement. Some are illconsidered and makeshift. Others are carefully crafted and highly
sophisticated. Having some potential to elicit broader compliance
with the law, such proposals merit international recognition,
examination and, where justified, support.

This article aims to shift debates about Chinese labor law in the
United States and other developed countries to a much greater level
of specificity. I undertake a detailed and systematic analysis of
those aspects of China’s labor laws and labor institutions
contributing to pervasive non-compliance. I find that the Chinese
regulatory framework is undermined by a profusion of imprecise

11 See, e.g. China Rioters Clash With Police Over Unpaid Wages, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Sep. 30 2005.
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and sometimes contradictory legal rules, a bureaucratic ‘command
and control’ approach to inspection and dispute resolution, and a
narrow and ineffective range of tools for inducing compliance.

The legal material relevant to China’s labor abuses is vast and the
associated issues highly complex, so it is necessary to choose
specific abuses to render the analysis manageable. This article
focuses on two: underpayment of wages for work performed12 and
prolonged periods of excessive working hours.13 These specific
abuses have been selected for three reasons. First, they are among
the most common labor abuses, affecting many millions of
workers. Second, they are, at least at first glance, violations of

12 Prohibited by Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa [Labor Law of the
People's Republic of China] (hereafter ‘Labor Law’), passed by the National
People’s Congress July 5, 1994 with effect from May 1, 1995, arts. 17, 50,
91.
13 Prohibited by Labor Law arts. 36-45 and 90.
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existing Chinese law.14 The National People’s Congress, the
highest organ of the Chinese state, has purported to prohibit these
abuses and has directed the official trade unions to act to prevent
them.15 Thus there is political commitment to combat them. The
abuses therefore directly raise the central question of this article:
why, given this commitment, is the law not enforced?

Third, underpayment of wages and prolonged periods of
excessive working hours are both practices which are generally
agreed, within and outside China, to be unjustifiable. T hey are not
technical or tolerable breaches of the law. True, there is much
controversy among scholars and policy-makers about how far the
14 Of course, several other labor practices, particularly denial of the right to
organize trade unions outside the official government structure, constitute
labor abuses according to international labor standards, but not according to
Chinese law.
15 See e.g., Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa [Trade Union Law of the
People's Republic of China] (hereafter Trade Union Law), passed by the
National People’s Congress on April 3, 1992 and revised October 27, 2001,
with effect from that date, art. 22.
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state should intervene, if at all, in setting wages and working hours.
Some neo-liberal lawyers and economists, for example, believe that
minimum wages are counter-productive,16 in which case their nonobservance is unproblematic, even desirable. However, even on this
neo-liberal view, the problem of wage arrears in China must be
addressed, because it is not simply a case of payment below the
minimum wage; frequently workers are not paid at all for work
performed. The issue goes fundamentally to the enforceability of
contracts, which neo-liberals, too, uphold.17 Likewise, some object
to setting working hours at low levels unsupported by clear health
and safety rationales.18 These objections lose their force, in the case

16 For a succinct outline of this argument, see, e.g. RICHARD POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 361-65 (5th ed. 1998). For a more positive
evaluation of minimum wages, see, e.g. UNITED KINGDOM LOW PAY
COMMISSION, NATIONAL MINIMUM WAGE: LOW PAY COMMISSION REPORT
2005 (2005).
17 POSNER, supra note 16 at 101-108.
18

As is well known, arguments against certain forms of hours regulation appear
in the majority judgment in Lochner v. People of State of New York, 198 U.S.
45 (1905) (restrictions on working hours of bakers were an unconstitutional
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of Chinese working hours violations, because in very many
instances the violations are demonstrably injurious to health.

This article is structured as follows. Part II of the paper briefly
describes the extent of underpayment of wages and working hours
abuses in China. Part III concentrates on the internal structure of
the legal rules and legal institutions that regulate work, especially
with respect to remuneration and working hours. I analyze the
production of legal rules, the enforcement work of the bureaucracy,
the principal labor dispute resolution institutions, and the functions
of the official trade union organization (which I treat as a quasiregulatory agency). I conclude by discussing a promising regional
initiative.

In Part IV, I sketch out several reform proposals. Drawing on
successful international examples of regulatory innovation, as well
as recent creative Chinese experiments in labor enforcement, I

interference on the right of contract between employer and employee and not
justified by health considerations).
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propose regulatory initiatives that have realistic prospects of
inducing greater adherence to the law in China’s current political
and economic context.

Of course, no legal reforms will definitively close the gap
between the letter of labor law and workplace practice. Deficient
implementation of, and compliance with, law is universal. Even in
developed countries, labor regulation19 frequently fails to induce
19 ‘Regulation’ has, to say the least, a variety of meanings: Julia Black,
Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation and SelfRegulation in a Post-Regulating World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 103,
128-142 (2001). In this paper, I generally use the term to refer to state-based
law, unless I indicate that a broader sense of regulation is intended. Labor
regulation refers to regulation pertaining to work relations. It includes what
in common law countries would be considered ‘private law’. The distinction
between ‘regulation’ and ‘common law’ is not helpful in the context of this
paper for several reasons. First, ‘private law’ even in common law countries,
can be analysed as a form of regulation: see e.g., Hugh Collins, Regulating
Contract Law, in REGULATING LAW 13, 17-28 (Christine Parker et al. eds.,
2004), not least in the context of labor relations: Richard Johnstone &
Richard Mitchell, Regulating Work, in REGULATING LAW 101 (Christine
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change in workplaces or has provoked unintended changes.20 This
is unsurprising: work relations are characterized by diverse social
systems or frames of reference. Workplace participants determine
their actions not just with a view to legal validity, but also, or even
more so, on the basis of matters such as cost-benefit calculations,
concordance with organizational decision-making and politics,
consistency with local ‘custom and practice’ and perspectives about
appropriate gender roles. In light of this complexity, attempts to

Parker et al. eds., 2004). Second, as the discussion in this article makes clear,
Chinese law pertaining to labor contracts has not emerged from the general
law of contracts but has been created by the Labor Law simultaneously with
the establishment of ‘regulatory’ labor standards. Third, the labor abuses we
are concerned with here traverse both (in common law terms) ‘private law’
and state based regulation. Thus, failure to pay agreed wages is at the same
time a breach of contract (viewed as an aspect of private law in Western
systems) and a matter for administrative sanction.
20 See e.g., the studies in REFLEXIVE LABOR LAW (Roger Rogowski ed., 1994).
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invoke law to achieve a change in work relations practices may be
ineffective, counterproductive and/or incoherent.21

Nonetheless, there is now a rich literature, based on regulatory
experience in the United States and other developed countries, that
identifies which forms of legal interventions are more likely to
achieve positive outcomes in a given context. This literature
informs my discussion of reform in China. Regulatory scholars
have suggested that, in many circumstances, ‘responsive’,
‘reflexive’ or ‘decentered’ forms of regulation have proved to be
superior alternatives to traditional ‘command and control’ style
rule-making, with its emphasis on state-based standard setting,
coupled with the imposition of sanctions. Chinese labor law heavily
emphasizes ‘command and control’ and so there is certainly a need
21 This is the ‘regulatory trilemma’: Christine Parker et al., Introduction, in
REGULATING LAW 1 (Christine Parker et al. eds., 2004); Gunther Teubner,
Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in JURIDIFICATION OF
SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR,
CORPORATE, ANTITRUST, AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW (Gunther Teubner ed.,
1987); HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 68-9 (1999).
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to consider alternative approaches. Unfortunately, the Chinese
political and economic context –particularly the repression of
independent civil society organizations, such as free labor unions, –
is a major obstacle to some of the most responsive and participative
forms of regulation.

II. ALL WORK AND NO PAY
Underpayment (or non-payment) of wages and the working of
excessive hours are both widespread in China. Wage arrears are
common in all parts of the economy.22 Even according to official
Chinese estimates,23 nearly 100 billion yuan (USD 12 billion) is
22Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, United States Department
of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China (2004),
released Feb 28, 2005, Section 6.
23 Much labor data in China remains secret, including information about wages,
corruption and strikes produced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security
and the All China Federation of Trade Unions: Human Rights in China &
China Labor Bulletin, Labor and State Secrets, 3 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM 23
(2004).
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owed to migrant workers.24 While arrears occur frequently in the
state-owned parts of the economy, non-payment of wages in the
private sector is an increasingly acute problem. This is because the
private sector, with its vast numbers of business entities and
manifold organizational forms, is now the most significant
employer of labor in the Chinese economy.25 An International

24 ‘Defaulting Wage Payment should be Incriminated’¸ Xinhua News Agency
March 8, 2005, available at http://www.china.org.cn/english/null/122105.htm
25 The statistics on the relationship between firms and employment are
confusing. For a thorough analysis of the available data from the State
Administration for Industry and Commerce, see the 2004 Asian Development
Bank Institute study: TOSHIKI KANAMORI & ZHIJUN ZHAO, ASIAN
DEVELOPMENT BANK INSTITUTE, PRIVATE SECTOR DEVELOPMENT IN THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2004). The authors conclude that some 69
million people were employed in state owned enterprises in 2003 (down from
a high of 113 million in 1995). This contrasts with around 90 million
employed in domestic private enterprises (up from 2.5 million in 1981). It
would seem from another set of (inconsistent) data cited by the authors, there
are about 38 million employed in collective enterprises, 10 million in firms
operated by Hong Kong, Macao or Taiwanese investors and 6.4 million in
other foreign invested firms. The authors conclude that there are 30 million
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Labor Organization (ILO) study reports that anywhere from 50% to
80% of private enterprises in Guangdong Province, China’s
manufacturing powerhouse, illegally retain wages.26 The practice is
so prevalent it is sometimes described as a ‘local custom’.27

Most importantly, underpayments in the private sector occur not
simply because firms are in economic difficulty (and therefore
unable to comply with their legal obligations). In many cases it is
simply fraudulent and manipulative conduct on the part of the

business entities in China, some 90% of them private. It is not clear how
many of these are also employers. For an analysis of the management
structures of the different firm types from an industrial relations perspective,
see BILL TAYLOR ET AL., INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN CHINA 47-76 (2003). See
also Ying Zhu, Economic Reform and Labor Market Regulation in China, in
LAW AND LABOR MARKET REGULATION IN EAST ASIA (Sean Cooney et al.
eds., 2002).
26 Gerard Greenfield & Tim Pringle, The Challenge of Wage Arrears in China,
in PAYING ATTENTION TO WAGES 30, 35 (Manuel Simon Velasco eds., 2002).
27 Id.
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debtor employer.28 For example, it is common for employers to
demand that workers pay a bond prior to commencing work.29 This
practice, together with the retention of wages, is used extensively in
order to impose labor discipline and prevent staff turnover,
especially during holiday periods.30

Turning to long working hours, these occur most prominently in
export-oriented manufacturing industry, where young female
workers predominate.31 Some surveys suggest that at least half of
28 See e.g., Anita Chan, Labor Standards and Human Rights: the Case of
Chinese Workers under Market Socialism, 1998 HUM. RTS. Q. 886, at 891893.
29 Id. at 889-891; Anita Chan, Globalization, China's Free (Read Bonded) Labor
Market and the Chinese Trade Unions, 6 (3-4) ASIA PACIFIC BUS. REV. 260,
261-268 (2000). In Chan’s 1996 survey of 54 private sector footwear
factories, more than 58% of migrant workers on the production line paid
bonds: id.
30 Greenfield & Pringle, supra note 26, at 35.
31 LANCE COMPA, AMERICAN CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL LABOR SOLIDARITY,
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN CHINA 38-44
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private enterprises do not comply with working hour regulations.32
In many clothing industry firms in Guangdong Province, workers
are required to work long hours every day for weeks during ‘peak’
season [wangji] in order to meet client orders. Some staff are
required to work for 48 hours straight,33 and overtime (usually paid
unlawfully at ordinary rates, if it is paid at all) reaches 150-200
hours per month.34 This latter figure translates to working weeks of
(2005); Ching Kwan Lee, From Organized Dependence to Disorganized
Despotism: Changing Labor Relations in Chinese Factories, 157 THE CHINA
QUARTERLY 44, 50-55 (1999).
32 According to one set of All China Federation of Trade Union (ACFTU)
statistics (not renowned for their reliability), only 15.8% of private
enterprises obey working hour regulations, most workers are not paid
overtime and workers have an average 50 hours per week: CHINA DAILY,
August

14,

2003

<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-

08/14/content_254678.htm>.
33 The End of the MFA and the Rising Tide of Labor Disputes in China, 1 (11)
CSR ASIA WEEKLY.
34 See e.g., KAI-MING LIU & SHEN TAN, KUAGUO GONGSI DE SHEHUI ZEREN YU
ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [Corporate Social Responsibility in China] 83
- 85 (2003);
see also Minghua Zhao & Jackie West, Rural Female Labor in Chinese State
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seventy to ninety hours, well in excess of the legal maximum of
around 50 hours.35 These practices (especially in firms with East
Asian employers) are often accompanied by authoritarian
management behaviors where staff activities during working time
are closely controlled.36

To be sure, some workers actively seek longer hours in order to
maximize their earnings.37 However, the recorded stories of many

Cotton Mills, in WOMEN AND WORK IN GLOBALISING ASIA 175-179 (DongSook Gills & Nicola Piper eds., 2002). In the ‘off’ season [danji], on the
other hand, workers are laid off in large numbers.
35 See infra Part III.A.4.
36 CHAN, supra note 2, at 46-81; Mary Gallagher, Time is Money, Efficiency is
Life. The Transformation of Labor Relations in China, 39(2) STUDIES IN
COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 11, 33-35 (2004).
37 Asian Labor News reports an instance of a mass worker protest because a
firm, pressured by its US customers, attempted to reduce hours to 60 per
week:

Workers

Riot

for

the

Right

<http://www.asianlabor.org/archives/001832.php>.

to

Work

Commenting

Overtime:
on

the

report, Stephen Frost, editor of the news service, points out that the workers
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other individual Chinese workers, as well as more general data,
illustrate not only that long hours are widely resented, but that they
frequently lead to poor physical and mental health and the erosion
of personal and family life.38 This is consonant with the
preponderance of international empirical studies on the effects of
long working hours, those effects being increasingly significant
once a person is consistently working more than 50 hours a week
(depending on the nature of the job and other factors).39
themselves were not involved in the negotiations and that the relationship
between wages and hours was not clarified. There is, of course, a link
between the two abusive labor practices considered here since poor and
unreliable remuneration induces many workers to work for longer hours than
they otherwise would if they received their lawful and agreed entitlements.
38 See e.g., the stories collected in CHAN, supra note 2; Anita Chan, Culture of
Survival: Lives of Migrant Workers through the Prism of Private Letters, in
POPULAR CHINA 163 (Perry Link et al. eds., 2002); at the China Working
Women Network: <http://www.cwwn.org/chisimp/chisimp_main.html>.
39 For a comprehensive review of the international evidence on the link between
extended hours of work, health and quality of family life, see the decision of
the Full Bench of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission in the
Working

Hours

Case,

PR072002

available

at
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One group of Chinese workers is particularly vulnerable to wage
arrears and long working hours: migrant laborers (that is, workers
migrating from China’s rural areas or nongmingong). They are
regularly accorded treatment inferior to their urban counterparts. It
is they who bear the brunt of labor abuses, including
underpayments and excessive working hours.40

<http://www.airc.gov.au/documents/full_bench/full_bench_decisions.html>,
especially at [120]-[179].
40 The poor treatment of migrant workers has been widely chronicled: see e.g.,
KAIMING LIU, BIANYUAN REN [The Marginalised People] English title:
Migrant Labor in South China (2003); DOROTHY SOLINGER, CONTESTING
CITIZENSHIP IN URBAN CHINA: PEASANT MIGRANTS, THE STATE, AND THE
LOGIC OF THE MARKET (1999); COMPA, supra note 31
, at 44 -55. Individual
accounts by women migrant workers telling of their poor conditions are
regularly collected and published on the website of the Chinese Working
Women’s Network: <www.cwwn.org>.
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Estimates of migrant workers vary widely, but they number well
in excess of 100 million.41 They provide the mass workforce
necessary to carry out low skilled tasks in the innumerable factories
(female migrant workers) and construction sites (male migrant
workers) in China’s more prosperous cities and towns. Migrant
workers are frequently young and have poor training and career
prospects. They are often in poor health42 and remain dependent on
their home communities for social security support.43 There is an
entrenched view among firm managers that it is acceptable to

41 According to a Chinese National Bureau of Statistics report, there were 113.9
million workers from rural China in 2003. 69.9% of these traveled to Eastern
provinces and 47.3% were under 25. Migrant Workers Number 113.9 Million
in 2003, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 15, 2004.
42 See e.g., the 2001 survey of 1,043 workers by Chinese Working Women
Network, 'The Health Survey Report of Migrant Women Workers' (Chinese
Working Women Network, 2001). 37% of respondents experienced fainting
spells.
43 LIU, supra note 40, at 12–13.
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accord migrant workers worse treatment.44 On the other hand, in
comparison with migrant workers, the local residents are generally
much better educated, much better connected politically and
economically, and much more likely to occupy a skilled or
managerial position in, or indeed to own, enterprises employing
rural workers.45

The distinction between urban and rural workers has been
institutionalized by the household registration or hukou system,
which has specified for every Chinese citizen their place of
residence and classified them as either agricultural or non-

44 See e.g., the survey of managerial attitudes towards migrants in 118
enterprises in four major Chinese cities: John Knight et al., Chinese Rural
Migrants in Urban Enterprises: Three Perspectives, 35(3) JOURNAL OF
DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 73, Table 13 (1999). The most significant reason
given for recruiting migrant workers is that they can ‘bear hardship': 60% of
respondents.
45 SALLY SARGENSON, REWORKING CHINA'S PROLETARIAT 67 (1999).
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agricultural (or urban).46 Unskilled rural workers migrating to
Chinese cities have not generally been able to acquire urban
residency status, even if they remain for long periods in cities.
Their ‘agricultural’ status has prevented them from accessing urban
benefits and support services,47 and most importantly in the
workplace context, representation by official trade unions.48

Internal migration rules governing hukou are now being gradually
dismantled, with eleven provinces (including Guangdong) moving

46 On the origins and evolution of the hukou system, see Tiejun Cheng & Mark
Selden, The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s Hukou System, 139
THE CHINA QUARTERLY 644 (1994); Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The
Hukou System and Rural-urban Migration: Processes and Changes, 160 THE
CHINA QUARTERLY 818 (1999). The effects of the hukou residency system are
examined extensively in LIU, supra, note 40; on its effect on labor conditions,
see especially at 139–67, 209–44.
47 Id. at 832.
48 See infra notes 349-352 and accompanying text.
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toward their abolition.49 It is difficult to track the extent of the
dismantling process or to determine its effects. The hukou rules are
expressed in diverse administrative instruments at national and
local level, much of it for internal bureaucratic use only.50 Reforms
have so far been tentative and localized. If they take root generally,
the pervasive discrimination against migrant workers may ease. For
the moment, though, migrant workers continue to suffer seriously
from the effects of the hukou system.

Notwithstanding the hukou system, urban and rural workers are
entitled to the equal benefit of the protections of the Labor Law;:
the Law draws no formal distinction in the application of key
norms on the basis of hukou. In particular, both are entitled to be
paid for work performed and both are entitled to reasonable hours

49 See Fei-ling Wang, Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People:
China's hukou System in the 2000s, 177 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 115 (2004);
China Rethinks Peasant 'Apartheid' , BBC NEWS WEBSITE, November 15th,
2005.
50 Wang, supra note 49, at 115-117.
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of work. Thus, while the hukou system might explain in part why
there is widespread discrimination against migrant workers, it does
not excuse contravention of the Labor Law.

III. NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF LABOR LAW: FACTORS
INTERNAL TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM
Clearly, violations of core labor law principles are rife in China:
millions of workers are not paid their due wages for their labor
and/or are required to work hours injurious to health. While no
legal system can entirely eradicate these abuses, we may well ask
why the law does not do more to reduce their prevalence. This Part
explores the facets of formal Chinese labor regulation that blunt
and confuse its capacity to speak authoritatively to workplaces.

China’s legal system has been recreated in less than thirty years
from the wreckage of the Cultural Revolution.51 Little wonder then
51 For comprehensive accounts of the Chinese legal system, see RANDALL
PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE RULE OF LAW (2002);
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that it is fragile and inchoate. Interrelated internal shortcomings are
the state of legal rules; flaws in the bureaucratic modes of
enforcement; weakness in legal dispute institutions and the lack of
independent civil society organizations that can invoke the law on
behalf of individuals. While these shortcomings are characteristic
of the legal system as a whole, they also manifest themselves in the
specific context of labor relations.

A T H E S TATE

OF

L E G A L R U LES

1 The General Legal System

Since the late 1970s, there has been a profusion of rule making in
China as the country attempts to create a legal infrastructure for a
society undergoing extraordinary transformation. Legal discourse
STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
(1999); on implementation issues see also NEIL DIAMANT ET AL., ENGAGING
THE

LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR JUSTICE (2005);

JIANFU CHEN ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN CHINA - AN INTRODUCTION
(2002).
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has come to permeate the major areas of state activity.52 This
legislative activity has been impressive. Nonetheless, until very
recently, law making has not been subject to a detailed overarching
framework53 As Peerenboom writes:

52 For an extensive analysis of this process in relation to the methods of
maintaining social order, see Sarah Biddulph, The Legal Field of Policing in
China: Administrative Detention and Legal Reform (2004) (unpublished
Ph.D. Thesis, University of Melbourne) (on file with the University of
Melbourne Library).
53 The Constitution sets out the roles of governmental organs, but only in very
general terms. Major steps forward in systematizing the legal order have been
taken with the passage of the Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Lifa Fa [Law of
the People’s Republic on China on Legislation] (hereafter Legislation Law),
passed by the National People’s Congress on March 15, 2000, with effect
from July 1, 2000; the Xingzheng Fagui Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli
[Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative
Regulations], promulgated by the State Council on November 16, 2001 with
effect from January 1, 2002 and the Guizhang Zhiding Chengzu Tiaoli
[Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules], promulgated
by the State Council on the same date.
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A number of entities have been afforded the right to
legislate, which has resulted in a bewildering array of laws,
regulations, provisions, measures, directives, notices,
decisions, explanations, and so forth, all claiming to be
normatively binding and treated so by the creating entity.54

Legal rules are produced by, in hierarchical order,55 the National
People’s Congress and its Standing Committee (enacting falü or
‘laws’56); the State Council (promulgating xingzheng fagui or
‘administrative

regulations’),57

people’s

congresses

at

the

provincial and equivalent levels (enacting difangxing fagui or ‘local

54 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 241.
55 See in particular, Legislation Law, arts. 78-83.
56 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa [Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China] (hereafter PRC Constitution) passed by the National
People’s Congress December 4, 1982 (since amended four times) arts. 62 and
67 and Legislation Law, Chapter 2.
57 See PRC Constitution, art. 89; Legislation Law, Chapter 3.
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regulations’);58 and a large number of bodies including provincial
governments, government ministries and commissions (issuing
rules generically described as guizhang,59 but having a wide range
of titles). Below this point in the hierarchy sit ‘normative
documents’ (guifanxing wenjian) issued by governmental bodies;
such documents include rules on the border of law, policy and
interpretation.

The legal materials produced by these governmental bodies suffer
from a variety of weaknesses.60 First, many legal instruments,
including major laws, are overly vague, to the extent of containing
very significant omissions (including reference to other nonexistent instruments). They also confer broad discretions on
implementing agencies.61 A ‘bare bones’ approach to statute
making is not inherently unworkable; indeed it is characteristic of
58 See PRC Constitution, art. 100; Legislation Law, Chapter 4, Section 1.
59 See arts. 90, 107 PRC Constitution; Legislation Law Chapter 4, Section 2.
60 See e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 51; Biddulph, supra note 52, at 183-190.
61 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 247-253.
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many civil law jurisdictions. However, in contrast to societies
where statutes sit alongside long standing complementary
processes of subordinate rule-making and judicial interpretation,
the elaboration of China’s key statutes is frequently either
insufficient or confusing.

Second, some legal rules, especially lower-level rules, are
unavailable to the public, either because they are intended for
internal use only, or because the promulgating agency has failed to
publish them properly.62 Although legislation now requires most
forms of legal rules to be gazetted in the relevant official
publication and reproduced in newspapers,63 this does not extend
to normative documents. This problem is compounded by the fact
that legal rules change very frequently; indeed many are introduced
on a temporary or provisional basis only.64

62 Id. at 245-247.
63 Legislation Law, arts. 66, 70, 77.
64 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 253-255.
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Third, rules are often inconsistent with each other. This may be
because, for example, lower level rules have not been amended
despite the passage of inconsistent superior legislation, or because
different agencies attempt to regulate the same matter, or because a
superior law has proved unworkable and interim measures are
needed.65

Fourth, Chinese courts do not have general authority to interpret
rules, to resolve conflicts between rules, or to declare rules invalid,
although they may refuse to enforce rules in a specific case if they
are inconsistent with higher level laws.66 Generally speaking, the
power to interpret laws is vested in the body that formulated

65 Id. at 256-259.
66 Id. at 316-318, 420-424. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong
Fa

[Administrative

Litigation

Law

of

the

People's

Republic

of

China](hereafter Administrative Litigation Law), passed April 4 1989 with
effect from October 1, 1990, arts. 12(2), 52-53.
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them,67 although this power is partially delegated to the Supreme
People’s Court, which frequently issues interpretations of law.68

The power to invalidate rules which conflict with superior
instruments or with other rules of similar status lies with bodies
exercising legislative or executive, rather than judicial power, such
as the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and
67 The power to interpret laws is vested in the Standing Committee of the
National People’s Congress, Legislation Law arts. 42-47. Administrative
Regulations are interpreted by the State Council: Regulations on the
Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative Regulations, supra note 53,
art. 31; Other rules are likewise interpreted by the formulating agency:
Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules, supra note 53,
art. 33. These provisions stipulate that interpretations have the same legal
effect as the original instrument.
68 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong Falü
Ruogan Wenti de Jieshi [Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court
Concerning Several Issues Regarding the Application of Law to the Trial of
Labor Disputes Cases] (hereafter Labor Dispute Interpretation) (Fashi 2001
No14), issued by the Supreme People’s Court April 16, 2001 with effect from
April 30, 2001. See also PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 317-318.
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the State Council.69 Citizens are able to petition the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress to invalidate a rule
that is contrary to the Constitution or a Law.70 However, this is not
very effective as the Standing Committee rarely invalidates rules.71
Further,

only

governmental

organs

are

able

to

request

interpretations or rules, not individual citizens.72 The overriding
impression this system leaves is that the processes for clarifying the
effect of rules are predominantly geared toward the internal
ordering of state agencies. This is of course important, but it
renders individual citizens seeking to ascertain the effect of legal
rules dependent on the bureaucracy.

69 Legislation Law, arts. 85-88.
70 Legislation Law, art. 90.
71 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 259. Citizens are also able to request the
State Council and other organs address conflicts between certain rules:
Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation of Rules art. 35.
72 Legislation Law, art. 43; Regulations on the Procedures for the Formulation
of Administrative Regulations, art. 32; Regulations on the Procedures for the
Formulation of Rules, art. 33.
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In short, it can be very difficult to ascertain what one’s legal
rights and obligations are. It should be emphasized that this
situation does not reflect the determination of a unified party-state
to stymie the legal system. On the contrary, it reflects compromises
and battles between and within organs at different levels of policymaking; tensions may be based on conflicting ideology,
bureaucratic self-interest, local-national friction, and so on.73
Indeed, there are many people at all levels of government
attempting to provide greater order in the legal system. Real
progress is illustrated by the enactment of the Legislation Law and
complementary State Council regulations.74 These instruments set
out a hierarchical ranking of legal instruments, establish clear
processes for rule-making and interpretation, place limits on lowerlevel regulation making, and require publication of legislative
instruments. However, it may take many years before these

73 See for example, the detailed analysis of the process of legal reform of
administrative detention conducted by Biddulph, supra note 52.
74 See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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principles are entrenched, especially in lower-level and regional
agencies.
2 Labor Law
Consider now how these system-wide problems manifest
themselves in the context of labor regulation.75 At first glance,
China appears to have built up a relatively comprehensive and
logically ordered framework of labor regulation. The Labor Law of
1994 establishes a contract-based system

of employment

regulation76 based on ‘voluntary’ and ‘equal’ negotiation, and
replaces the former communist system based on administrative
allocation.77 The Law goes on to stipulate a number of minimum
standards with which employment arrangements must comply.

75

See also VIRGINIA HO, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS
FOR LABOR RIGHTS AND LEGAL REFORM

(2003), 196-200.

76 Labor Law, art. 17
77 See generally, HILARY JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA 41-48 (2003); RONALD
KEITH & ZHIQIU LIN, LAW AND JUSTICE IN CHINA'S NEW MARKETPLACE 93127 (2001).
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These include the principles of non-discrimination78 and equal
work for equal pay,79 a prohibition on child labor,80 protection
against arbitrary dismissal,81 and a minimum wage.82 The Law
also contains provisions on collective contracts,83 vocational
training84 and social insurance benefits.85 Most relevantly for the
purposes of this article, the Law prohibits unjustified arrears and
excessive working hours.86 Additional major laws, in particularly
the Trade Union Law of 1992 (extensively revised in 2001)87 and
the Law on Work Safety of 2002)88 complement these provisions.
78 Labor Law arts. 12-14.
79 Id, art. 46.
80 Id. arts. 15, 64.
81 Id. arts. 23-32.
82 Id. arts. 48-49.
83 Id. arts. 33-35.
84 Id. arts. 66-69.
85 Id. arts. 71-76.
86 See infra Part III.A.4.
87 Trade Union Law, supra note 15.
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The Labor Law is a major legislative achievement. However, on
closer examination, the Law has serious limitations. It provides
only the skeleton of a regulatory framework, with its articles either
supplemented by subordinate legal instruments (which number in
the thousands)89 produced by various state agencies, or left
unelaborated.

This point can be illustrated by considering the rules pertaining to
the two labor abuses we are examining: wage arrears and excess
working hours. In both cases, we see that bright line rules rendering

88 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Anquan Shengchan Fa [Law of the People's
Republic of China on Work Safety] (hereafter Work Safety Law) passed by
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress June 29, 2002
with effect from November 1, 2002.
89 As of March 2005, there were some nine hundred and sixty such instruments
listed

on

the

Ministry

of

Labor

and

Social

Security

website:

<http://www.molss.gov.cn:8080/trsweb_gov/mainframe.htm>. These do not
include many provincial and local rules.
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both these abuses unlawful become more complex and attenuated
the more supplementary regulatory material is considered.
3 Underpayment of Wages
Looking firstly at wages, article 50 of the Law stipulates that:
Wages shall be paid monthly to workers in person in the
form of cash. Wages shall not be misappropriated (kekou)
nor shall the employer fall in arrears (tuoqian) without
justification.

Provisions complementary to article 50 require parties to the
employment

relationship

to

abide

by

their

contractual

commitments90 (which must at least include payment at the level of
the minimum wage).91
90 Labor Law, arts. 17 and 48.
91 Minimum wages are set at the provincial government or equivalent level and
are supposed to be adjusted at least once every two years: Labor Law arts. 48
and 49; Zuidi Gongzi Guiding [Regulations on the Minimum Wage],
promulgated on January 20, 2004 with effect from January 1, 2004, arts 7,
10. These Regulations set out a detailed formula to be followed in setting
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While these provisions appear to generate straightforward
obligations to pay wages, they are very vague. They do not define
wages. They do not spell out how they can be varied. They do not
provide for wage records to be kept and given to employees. They
do not explain what forms of labor service generate an entitlement
to wages; for example, what happens if there is no work to be
performed or an employee is sick or must perform a public duty.
They do not explain how to deal with a situation where an
employer-employee relationship is obscured by a network of
contractual

arrangements.

They

do

not

clarify

what

‘misappropriation’92 or ‘delay without justification’ means;
whether, for example, an employer is permitted to deduct wages for
losses allegedly sustained as a result of employee breach, or to pay

minimum wages, with the wage set at approximately 40 to 60% of the
average monthly wage in the relevant area: see id. Attachment: Method of
Calculation of the Minimum Wage.
92 kekou means to withhold money for personal gain.
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training expenses, or whether temporary economic difficulties
might count as ‘justification’.

One great difficulty here is that the Chinese legal system creates a
radical separation between employment contracts and other types
of contractual relationships.93 This sharp delineation is apparently
made for ideological reasons; it preserves in legal form the
ideological position that Chinese workers are not commodified.94

93 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hetong Fa [Contract Law of the People's
Republic of China], passed by the National People’s Congress March 15,
1999 with effect from October 1, 1999. art. 123 of the Contract Law provides
that ‘where other laws stipulate otherwise on contracts, such provisions shall
govern.’ Art 124 provides that ‘for contracts not explicitly regulated by the
Specific Provisions of this Law or other laws, the General Provisions of this
Law shall apply, and the most similar provisions in the Specific Provisions of
this Law or other laws may concurrently be used as reference.’ [emphasis
added]. Note that the Contract Law does regulate contracts for services (i.e.
independent contractor arrangements): Chapter 15.
94 See HUAI GUAN, LAODONG FAXUE (Labor Law) 215 (5th ed, 2001); for a
critique see KEITH & LIN, supra note 77, at 110-111; see further JOSEPHS,
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In any case, as the national contract law does not apply to
employment contracts, there is no contractual substratum such as
that which underpins employment contracts in common law or
other major civil law systems. It is thus a legal error to draw on
general contractual principles to determine the legal rules
applicable to, for example, central issues in wage disputes such as
when, how, by whom and to whom wages must be paid; the
circumstances in which non-payment may be justified; and, where
wages are not paid in accordance with law, how compensation is to
be determined.

This means that the Labor Law and related legislation ought to
spell out comprehensively the major principles relating to labor
contracting. However, while the Law does deal with individual
labor contracts, its specific treatment is limited to only twenty-one

supra note 77, at 28-30 (commenting on the ideological debates in the leadup to the introduction of the contract system).
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articles,95 ten of which solely concern termination.96 The Law is
silent on matters such as agency, variation, capacity, implication of
terms, good faith, the effect of work performed under an invalid
contract, transfer of business, and the principles for determining
compensation for breach.97 Although there are proposals for a labor

95 Labor Law, arts. 16-32, 97-99, 102. These brief articles concern the
negotiation of labor contracts (art. 17), invalidity (arts. 18, 97), mandatory
content (art. 19), duration (arts. 20-21), business secrets (art. 22), termination
(arts. 23-32), administrative punishments and compensation for breach by
employer or employee (arts. 98 and 102), and inducing breach of contract
(art. 99). By way of contrast, the general provisions of the Contract Law
consist of 129 articles, which are supplemented by further provisions dealing
with specific types of contracts.
96 Labor Law, arts. 23-32.
97 By contrast, most of these matters are generally dealt with in the Contract
Law. Although strictly speaking Chinese courts do not have authority to make
law, the Supreme People’s Court has provided some clarification of the
consequences of breach of employment contracts: Labor Disputes
Interpretation, supra note 68, arts. 14 and 15.
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contract law and/or a comprehensive law on wages,98 these laws
are yet to be adopted at the national level.

The lacunae in the regulatory framework are filled to some extent
by subordinate legal instruments, such as the Temporary
Regulations on the Payment of Wages99 issued by the Ministry of

98 I am aware from conversations with Chinese labor law scholars that drafts of
such laws are being discussed. See also Gerard Greenfield & Tim Pringle,
The Challenge of Wage Arrears in China, in PAYING ATTENTION TO WAGES 30
(Manuel Simon Velasco ed., 2002).
99 See e.g., Gongzi Zhifu Zanxing Guiding [Temporary Regulation on the
Payment of Wages], promulgated by the Ministry of Labor on December 6,
1994 with effect from January 1, 1995; Weifan he Jiechu Laodong Hetong de
Jingji Buchong Banfa [Measures on Economic Compensation for Violation
and Termination of Labor Contracts], promulgated by the Ministry of Labor
on December 3, 1994 with effect from January 1, 1995 (stipulating the rate of
compensation to be paid for termination, non-payment, underpayment or
delay in payment of wages); see also discussions in JINGSEN LI & JUNLING
JIA, LAODONG FAXUE [Labor Law] 68-83 (2004); GUAN, supra note 94, at
210-233. The Ministry of Labor is now the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security (MOLSS).
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Labor. However, these instruments are attended by the difficulties
outlined above. Let us track through how these instruments
elaborate at the national level the key terms ‘misappropriation’ and
‘fall into arrears without justification’ in Article 50, and in
particular how they deal with the very common practice of
retaining a bond.

The subordinate rules are mainly concerned with what does not
constitute misappropriation and delay. First, the Temporary
Regulations on the Payment of Wages address the question of
misappropriation. They permit an employer to make deductions for
tax and social security purposes, and in accordance with an
employment contract, as compensation for economic loss caused
by the employee.100 Further Supplementary Regulations issued by

100 Temporary Regulation on the Payment of Wages, supra note 99, art. 16. The
amount deducted per month may not exceed 20% of the employee’s monthly
wages, nor may the employee be paid less than the minimum wage. See LI &
JIA, supra note 99, at 198; JIAN GUO ET AL, LAODONG FAXUE [Labor Law]
189 (2001); GUAN, supra note 94, at 292.
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the Ministry extend the range of circumstances that do not
constitute ‘misappropriation’ to include deductions authorized by
work rules approved by workers’ congresses101 and reductions in
accordance with performance pay schemes, provided remuneration
does not fall below the minimum wage.102 The Supplementary
Regulations also indicate that arrears in payment are justified
where they result from a natural disaster and from a firm’s
economic difficulty where authorized by the union (but only up to a
maximum period specified by the local province).103 It is not until
we come to low-level instruments,104 a 1995 Opinion issued by the
101 On the nature and declining effectiveness of workers’ congresses, which are
formal structures for staff participation in firm decision-making, see TAYLOR
ET AL,

supra note 25, at 138-143.

102 Dui “Gongzi Zhifu Zhanxing Guiding” youguan Wenti de Buchong Guiding
[Supplementary Regulation on Questions concerning the Temporary
Regulation on the Payment of Wages] promulgated by the Ministry of Labor
on December 5, 1995 with immediate effect, cl 3.
103 Id. cl 4. Of course, this is problematic if provinces fail to specify a maximum
time limit.
104 These appear to fall into the category of ‘normative documents’.
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Ministry of Labor,105 and two Notices issued jointly by the
Ministry, the Ministry of Public Security and the All China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) that we find explicit
statements that employers are not permitted to require employees to
furnish any kind of bond or security. The Notice directed at the
private sector106 provides:
An enterprise must not collect currency, or other objects as
‘security upon entering the factory’ (ruchang diya), and

105 Laodong Bu guanyu Guanche Zhixing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Laodongfa Ruogan Wenti de Yijian [Ministry of Labor Opinion on Certain
Questions concerning the Implementation of the Labor Law of the PRC]
(hereafter 1995 Opinion), issued August 4, 1995, cl 24. On the question of
delay, cl 64 of the Opinion refers the reader to four other ‘notices’ or
‘regulations’ dealing with economic difficulties in state-owned enterprises.
106 Guanyu Jiaqiang Waishang Tuozi Qiye he Siying Qiye Laodong Guanli
Qieshi Baozhang Zhigong Hefa Quanyi de Tongzhi [Notice concerning
Strengthening the Real Protection of Workers’ Lawful Rights and Interests in
Foreign Invested and Private Enterprises], issued by the Ministry of Labor,
the Ministry of Public Security and the All China Federation of Trade Unions
on March 4, 1994.
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must not detain an employee’s identity card or temporary
resident card, or hold them as security. If any enterprise
without authorization details or holds as security a worker’s
residency card, the Ministry of Public Security and the
Labor Department Inspectorate must order it to immediately
return it to the worker in person.107

So, after much searching, we find that while deductions and
arrears are permissible in a variety of circumstances, these do not
include the practice of retaining a bond. It is clear from this
exercise that the important rules governing underpayment of wages
are not readily ascertainable by those who wish to assert their
rights. Indeed, one of the most significant rules - that against taking
bonds - is buried in low-level notices. Furthermore, while the
instruments themselves seem to be publicly available from the
MOLSS website (although this is not always up to date),

107 Id. cl. 2.
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availability is quite different from accessibility. The scattered
location of the applicable rules defies easy retrieval.108

4 Working Hours
The second example illustrating the limitations of the labor law
framework concerns working hours.109 The key principles seem
straightforward and reflective of the ‘standard’ twentieth century
regulatory approaches to working hours.110 On paper, they appear
to ensure that employees do not work excessive hours. The Labor
Law provides for an eight-hour day, and an average working week

108

HO, supra note 75, at 194-196.

109 GUO ET AL, supra note 100, at 149-161.
110These are reflected in ILO Conventions, especially Hours of Work (Industry)
Convention (ILO No 1), November 28, 1919 (entered into force 13th June
1921). Newer regulatory approaches are emerging, especially in the European
Union: see Deidre McCann, Regulating Working Time Needs and
Preferences,

in

WORKING TIME AND WORKERS'

PREFERENCES IN

INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES 10 (Jon Messenger ed., 2004).
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of 44 hours.111 Workers are entitled to at least one day off per
week112 to public holidays,113 and, if they have over one year’s
service, to paid leave.114

The Law also regulates overtime; generally this is limited to one
hour per day.115 However, an extension of the working day by up
to three hours is permitted for ‘special reasons’ (teshu yuanyin) on
the conditions that workers’ health is protected and that the total
monthly extension is no more than 36 hours.116 Any extension to
working hours is subject to consultation with the unions and the
workers concerned.117 Extensions of working hours in violation of
111 Labor Law, art. 36. Firms using piece rates must adapt their quotas and
remuneration to this system: art. 37.
112 Id. art 38.
113 Id. art 40.
114 Id. art 45.
115 Id. art. 41.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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the law are expressly prohibited.118 Penalty rates apply to overtime
work (150%), to work arranged on leave days (200%) and to work
on public holidays (300%).119

This concise framework is, however, significantly modified both
by the Law itself and by other legal instruments; these render the
standards both more and less stringent.

As to making the standards more stringent, within months of the
Law entering into effect, the State Council promulgated a short
regulation stipulating ordinary working hours as forty (not fortyfour) hours per week.120 This created some confusion, since the
118 Id. arts. 43, 90.
119 Id. art. 44.
120 Guowuyuan guanyu Zhigong Gonzuo Shijian de Guiding [State Council
Regulation concerning Working Hours], promulgated by the State Council
March 25, 1995, in effect from May 1, 1995, art. 3. This change was made
apparently because it was believed that China was sufficiently advanced to
permit lower working hours: (LI & JIA, supra note 99, at 111). This
conclusion appears to have been premature.
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State Council’s regulation prescribed no penalties for failure to
comply. The Labor Ministry (as it then was), having authority to
interpret the State Council regulation,121 subsequently indicated
that a firm operating between forty and forty-four hours per week
could be ordered to ‘make corrections’ (gaizheng) but did not
indicate whether such a firm could be fined.122

Still, whether the working week is forty or forty-four hours, it
seems plain that the long ‘peak season’ working periods described
above are manifestly unlawful. At most, employees could be
required to work for no more than nine eleven hours days per
month, and roughly 48 hours per week (on a forty hour base) or 52

121 State Council Regulation concerning Working Hours, supra note 120, art. 8.
122 This clarification, issued in 1997, was in response to a request from the
Guangzhou Labor Bureau: Guanyu Zhigong Gongzuo Shijian youguan Wenti
de Fuhan [Reply concerning Working Hours], issued by the Ministry of
Labor on September 10, 1997.

56

hours per week (on a forty-four hour base).123 These hours would
attract significant overtime payments.

However, the Law opens the door to allowing broad departures
from the standards just stated. The two relevant provisions are
articles 39 and 42. Article 39 provides that where, owing to the
‘special nature of production’ (yin shengchan tedian), an employee
cannot follow the stipulations on the forty-four hour week and the
one day of leave per week, it may, with the approval of the
administrative department of labor, adopt other rules on working
hours and rest (described below as ‘non-standard working hours
systems’). Article 42 provides that working hours may be extended
beyond the limits described in other articles in the event of an
emergency threatening the health of workers or the safety of
property, where urgent repairs are needed to production facilities
and in ‘other circumstances stipulated by laws and administrative
rules’ (falü, xingzheng fagui guiding de qita qingxing).

123 These are based on various combinations of a forty, or forty-four, hour week
and thirty-six hours overtime.
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Both these provisions leave a large amount of discretion to
administrative agencies to devise their own rules on working hours.
This has been done both at the national level by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Security (MOLSS) and locally by provincial and
municipal labor departments. The MOLSS rules on non-standard
working hours systems124 refer to two separate schemes of nonstandard working hours: irregular hours and ‘accumulated hours’
(including annualized hours). Irregular hours schemes would seem
to involve the complete exclusion of the Labor Law’s standards.125
Accumulated hours schemes permit employers to calculate hours
on a weekly, monthly, seasonal or annualized basis in which only

124 Guanyu Qiye Shixing Buding Shigong Zhi he Zonghe Jisuan Gongshi
Gongzuo de Shenpi Banfa [Measures concerning the Approval of the
Implementation in Enterprises of Systems of Non-standard Working Hours
and of Accumulated Working Hours] (hereafter Working Hours Measures),
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor on December 14, 1994, with effect
from January 1, 1995, art. 4.
125 Id. art. 4.
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the average (pingjun) working day and working week must be
‘basically similar’ (jiben xiangtong) to the standards in the Law.126

The MOLSS rules specify the categories of work to which these
schemes may apply and the use of catchall phrases permits broad
application of the opt-out provisions. Such phrases include
‘workers who, because of special nature of production, the special
requirements of work, or the scope of job responsibilities, are
suitable for non-standard working hours’, ‘other workers whose
work cannot be measured in standard hours’127 and ‘other
employees for whom accumulated hours schemes are suitable’.128

It is essentially up to the local labor bureaus to determine whether
employer proposed schemes should be approved. The MOLSS
rules stipulate the considerations that bureaus are to take into
account in approving the schemes only in general terms: they must
126 Id. art 5. Note that such systems can be used to reduce overtime payments.
127 Id. art. 4(1), (3) (in relation to irregular hours schemes).
128 Id. art 5.
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ensure that employers protect employees’ health, listen to their
opinions and protect their right to rest and leave – while also
ensuring the completion of production tasks.129 Some local labor
bureaus have issued rules tightening the circumstances in which
these opt-out schemes can be used. Thus, in the Beijing area,
irregular hours schemes cannot be used for production workers,130
and both non-standard hours schemes must be devised through
consultation with the firm’s union, workers’ congress or with the
workers directly131 and may be approved for a maximum of three

129 Id. art 6.
130 Beijingshi Qiye Shishi Zonghe Jisuan Gongshi Gongzuozhi he Buding Shi
Gongzuozhi de Banfa [Beijing Municipality Measures on Enterprise
Implementation of Systems of Accumulated Hours of Work and NonStandard Working Hours], issued by Beijing Labor Department December 9,
2003 with effect from January 1, 2004, art. 11(5).
131 Id. art. 14. The application form in the Beijing area requires the inclusion of
union or workers’ congress comments.
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years.132 Other municipalities such as Shanghai and Shenzhen have
not been so prescriptive.133

While a person with legal expertise might be able to develop an
accurate

understanding

of

the

law

in

this

area,

many

businesspeople, workers and local government officials are likely
to struggle to determine the precise state of the law on working
hours. Moreover, many workers risk seeing their entitlements to
reasonable working hours eviscerated by bureaucrats partial to
employer perspectives.

5 ‘Non-Standard Workers’
In addition to the shortcomings specific to remuneration and
working hours, there is further limitation that underlies the
132 Id. art. 16.
133 Compare, for example, the Shenzhen Jingji Tequ Laowugong Tiaoli
[Regulation of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Migrant Workers],
as amended by the Standing Committee of the Shenzhen Municipal People’s
Congress, February 13 1998.
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framework regulating labor law as a whole. As mentioned earlier,
the Law creates a radical separation between employment contracts
and other types of contractual relationships.134 This separation fails
to recognize one of the dominant challenges for contemporary
labor regulation. Increasingly, work relationships are no longer
typified by the putative subject of traditional135 employment
regulation: long-term employees engaged by a clearly identifiable
employer. Around the world, as a result of technological changes in
production processes, ever more elaborate and unstable global
supply chains, employer strategies and many other factors, work in
many countries is being increasingly performed by part-time or
casual workers (very often female), or is being contracted out to
firms with few or no regular workers.136 The traditional boundary

134 See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
135 I am referring to the mode of employment regulation that characterized
much of the last century.
136 See e.g., KATHERINE W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); MANUEL CASTELLS,
THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY (1996).
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between

an

employee

and

an

‘independent

contractor’,

fundamental to the conceptual structure of labor law, has become
very blurred. This global trend is mirrored in China. As the vestiges
of the command economy disappear, and global supply chains
anchor their labor intensive manufacturing in a vast network of
Chinese firms, new forms of work arrangements are proliferating,
many of them short-term and precarious.137

Many societies have sought to adapt their regulatory framework
in response to these changes in work arrangements, so as to avoid
seeing increasing numbers of people working outside that
framework. However, China’s labor law and labor institutions very
much persist with the traditional approach and the complete legal
uncoupling of labor contracting from

general contracting

accentuates this. While the Labor Law is broad in terms of the
types of enterprise it covers,138 it applies only to certain categories
of workers, namely to ‘workers (laodongzhe) who form a labor
137 See Gallagher, supra note 36, at 21-26.
138 GUAN, supra note 94, at 148-149.
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relationship (laodong guanxi) with enterprises…’139 This phrase
sets the boundary between those workers to whom the Labor Law
standards apply and those whose work relations are governed by
the general contract law. However, the phrase is quite vague; it is
not apparent how it should be applied to work relationships that
could either be categorized as employer-employee or as two
independent contractors. Such relationships include homeworkers
(or outworkers) in the textile industry or individual trades people in
the construction industry.

A second boundary question concerns the situation in which it is
a worker is clearly an employee but it is difficult to identify who
the employer is. Such a problem arises where workers are
transferred between firms, when firms merge or divide, or in longterm labor hire arrangements. Again, we need to look to
subordinate and local legislation to address this question and

139 Labor Law, art. 2.
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nowhere is it dealt with comprehensively.140 For example, while
the MOLSS’s 1995 Opinion on the Labor Law seeks to delineate
the category of workers to which the Law applies, it does so by
listing certain exclusions.141 It does not address the ‘boundary’
question.142

Guidance on how to decide whether a person is a worker for the
purposes of the Law is crucial. Not only will it indicate whether
labor standards apply to that person, it will also determine whether

140 This issue is dealt with in some of the provincial level contract regulations:
see e.g., Shanghai Shi Laodong Hetong Tiaoli [Shanghai Municipality Labor
Contract Regulations], passed by Shanghai Municipality People’s Congress,
November 15, 2001, with effect from May 1, 2002, arts. 24 and 25.
141 1995 Opinion, supra note 105, art. 3. This states that the Labor Law does not
apply to ‘government functionaries (gongwuyuan), agricultural laborers
(nongcun laodongzhe, not including workers in town and village enterprises,
or who work in cities), military personnel and domestic servants (jiating
baomu).
142 Nor do major textbooks, see e.g., GUAN, supra note 94; LI & JIA, supra note
99; GUO ET AL, supra note 100.
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the labor bureau and the labor disputes arbitration committees have
jurisdiction, and whether the person is eligible to be a union
member.

To be sure, it is not only in China that legal concepts, including
those pertaining to the employment relationship, evolve in a piecemeal fashion. The Chinese can scarcely be criticized because the
elaboration process has had to be compressed into a few years
rather than centuries as in Western legal systems. What is
distinctively problematic about the Chinese mode of elaboration,
however, is that the pursuit of detail takes an inquirer ever further
away from laws directed at the general public to often temporary
legal instruments primarily designed for and directed at state
agencies.143 The people informed about the legal position are the
labor bureaucracy rather than, at least in the first instance,
employers, employees, or the courts.

143 Thus, labor regulation is frequently addressed to labor bureaus in the various
provinces and relevant ministries.
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Many legal experts in China are alert to the deficiencies of the
labor law framework: one important response is that a Labor
Contract Law is currently being drafted nationally.144 This may
make it much easier for employers and employees to determine
their rights and obligations in relation to the payment of wages, and
indeed for bureaucrats to understand what rules they must
implement. Several provincial level congresses have already
enacted their own local regulations on labor contracts145 and/or
wages.146 While these different initiatives lead to further

144 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
145 E.g. Shanghai Shi Laodong Hetong Tiaoli [Shanghai Municipality Labor
Contract Regulations], passed by Shanghai Municipality People’s Congress,
November, 15 2001, with effect from May 1, 2002; Beijing Shi Laodong
Hetong Guiding [Beijing Municipality Labor Contract Regulations], issued
by the Beijing Labor Bureau with effect from February 1, 2002.
146 See e.g., Shanghai shi Qiye Gongzi Zhifu Banfa [Shanghai Municipality
Enterprise Wage Payment Measures], issued by the Shanghai Labor and
Social Security Department with effect from April 1, 2003; Guangdong sheng
Gongzi Zhifu Tiaoli [Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of
Wages], promulgated by the Standing Committee of the Guangdong
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fragmentation and inconsistency, they may provide models for law
at the national level. One promising attempt to create a
comprehensive and comprehensible framework, responding not
only to the need to specify clear norms but also to problems with
enforcement, is examined at the end of this Part.

B E N FO R C IN G

TH E

R U L ES : B U R EA U C R ATIC

I M P LE M E N TAT IO N
Notwithstanding the difficulties in identifying exactly what the
relevant legal norms are, many of the more extreme instances of
withholding wages and requiring long working hours (especially
where no departure from the standard hours systems has been
authorized) can be safely characterized as unlawful.

The

widespread nature of these abuses suggests that the means of
securing compliance with the law have severe shortcomings. There
are three main, interrelated, state vehicles for implementing labor
law: enforcement by state agencies, dispute resolution processes
Provincial People’s Congress on February 19, 2005 with effect from May 1,
2005.
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and monitoring by the official trade union organization.147 The
function and structure of each body is summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Function and Structure of Key Implementation Bodies
Relevant
function

Base level

‘Vertical’
‘Horizontal’
148
relationships
relationships

Labor
Department
Inspectorates

Enforce labor
laws

Local
Subordinate to Subordinate to
departmental MOLSS
local People’s
offices
Government and
People’s Congress

Labor Dispute
Arbitration
Committees
(LDACs)

Mediate and
arbitrate labor
disputes

Attached to
local labor
departments

Subordinate to Subordinate to
MOLSS
local People’s
Government and
People’s Congress

People’s
Courts

Hear appeals
from LDACs;
Enforce
arbitrated
awards and
court orders

Basic
People’s
Courts

Court
hierarchy
culminating in
Supreme
People’s Court

Trade Unions

Supervise
Enterprise
implementation union
of labor laws

Resourced and
appointed by local
People’s
Government and
People’s Congress

Subordinate to Union officials
union
often closely
federations on linked or identical

147 On the formal processes for enforcement of the labor law, see generally,
GUAN, supra note 94, at 553-577.
148 On the significance of ‘vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ relationships, see infra note
200 and accompanying text.
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and compliance
with labor
contracts

to enterprise
management
and/or party
organization

geographic
and industry
basis and to
peak body
(ACFTU)

This and the two following sectors examine these institutions in
more detail, commencing with labor departments.

In China, the burden for ensuring that labor laws are enforced is
placed even more heavily on administrative agencies than it is in
many other countries. Most labor law norms (as with very many
legal rules in China) take the form of ‘command and control’
regulation.149 Legal instruments state rules, charge an agency with

149 The particular emphasis on command and control in China is in part a legacy
of a legal tradition in which law has been long viewed as a tool of state policy
rather than as a source of rights: Zhiping Liang, Explicating Law: a
Comparative Perspective of Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 JOURNAL
OF

CHINESE LAW 55 (1989); LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN EAST ASIA:

THE RULE OF LAW AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed.,
1999); Pitman Potter, Riding the Tiger: Legitimacy and Legal Culture in
Post-Mao China, 138 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 325 (1994).
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implementing them and then set out a range of sanctions that that
agency or another state agency can impose if the rules are
violated.150

The main institutions responsible for implementing labor law are
the ‘labor administration departments established under people’s
governments above county level’ (xianji yishang geji renmin
zhengfu laodong xingzheng bumen).151 These local labor
departments,152 which operate both under the MOLSS and under

150 See e.g., ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC
THEORY 4, 245-256 (1994).
151 Labor Law, art. 85. See also Laodong Baozhang Jiancha Tiaoli [Regulations
on Labor Protection Inspection] (hereafter Labor Inspection Regulations),
promulgated by the State Council on October 26, 2004, with effect from
December 1, 2004. See LI & JIA, supra note 99, at 206-207: GUAN, supra
note 94, at 543-548.
152 Although these are now formally labor and social security departments, I
will use the briefer term ‘labor department’ .

71

their local provincial or municipal government,153 have jurisdiction
in relation to most aspects of labor law within their area, with the
important exception of occupational health and safety.154 The
Labor Law requires labor departments to ‘supervise and inspect’
(jinxing jiandu jiancha) employer compliance with labor

153 Each province, together with the autonomous regions and the four
municipalities of provincial status (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and
Chongqing), has its own labor and social security ting (provincial
department) or ju (bureau or office). Below these are branch offices attached
to significant cities, or (in the case of Beijing and Shanghai) parts of major
cities. Many of these in turn have sub-branch offices. For a listing of labor
and social security departments and offices at provincial and regional levels,
see <http://www.lm.gov.cn/links/links-bztj.htm>.
154 Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 35. In 1998, responsibility for workplace
safety was transferred from the Ministry of Labor to the State Administration
of Work Safety (Guojia Anquan Shengchan Jiandu Guanli Zongju, SAWS)
and its sister agency, the State Administration of Coal Mine Safety. At the
same time, responsibility for occupational illness was transferred to the
Ministry of Health. These agencies have their own provincial and local level
departments separate from the MOLSS:

Work Safety Law art. 9, and

Occupational Health Law art. 8..
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regulation.155 They do so through inspectorates established in the
principle provincial/municipal departmental offices and in local
branch and sub-branch offices.

The precise responsibilities, procedural rules and enforcement
powers of labor inspectors were until very recently governed
mainly by a complex set of rules promulgated at various times by
the MOLSS156 as well as by other governmental organs at the
provincial and municipal level. Fortunately, the State Council’s
2004 Labor Inspection Regulations have authoritatively updated
and consolidated these rules.157

The Labor Inspection Regulations, elaborated in supplementary
rules promulgated by the MOLSS,158 establish a clear process for
155 Labor Law art. 85.
156 MOLSS had promulgated at least 8 separate instruments.
157 Supra note 151.
158 Guanyu Shishi Laodong Baozhang Jiancha Tiaoli Ruogan Guiding [Certain
Provisions concerning Implementation of the Regulations on Labor
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dealing with allegations that the labor law has been violated. Any
person159 or organization may report a violation of the law to their
local labor department, and any worker whose rights or interests
have been violated by an employer may lodge a complaint within
two years of becoming aware of the violation.160 These include
complaints about unpaid wages and excessive overtime, and indeed
in at least some areas, these are the most common complaints.161 A
labor department must respond to the complaint within 5 working
days either by accepting it, asking for further information, referring

Protection Inspection](hereafter Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions)
issued by the MOLSS on January 24, 2005 with effect from February 1,
2005.
159 A group of persons may jointly lodge a complaint, and appoint a
representative: id. art. 12.
160 Labor Inspection Regulations, arts. 9, 20.
161 Isabelle Thireau & Linshan Hua, One Law, Two Interpretations: Mobilizing
the Labor Law in Arbitration Committees and in Letters and Visits Offices, in
ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
JUSTICE 91 (Neil Diamant et al. eds., 2005).
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the complainant to the correct jurisdiction162 or advising the
complainant that the claim is unacceptable.163

If the complaint is accepted, departmental officers must
investigate it; they may exercise wide powers to enter premises,
interview people, engage accountants, collect data and preserve

162 If cases fall within the jurisdiction of another agency, they must be sent to it,
and if the labor department suspects that criminal conduct is involved, the
case must be referred to the Procuratorate: Labor Inspection Regulations art.
18. Cases that have already been dealt with by the labor dispute procedures
are not subject to further investigation by the labor department: id. art. 21.
163 Id. art. 14. Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 18. Some matters
involving payment of compensation to employees for loss arising from
unlawful conduct (such as payment arising from an invalid contract) must be
referred to labor dispute resolution procedures: Labor Inspection Regulations
art. 21; Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions arts. 15-16.
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evidence.164 Cases must be completed within a maximum of 90
days from commencement.165

If they find that breaches of the legislation and rules have
occurred, the local labor departments can exercise a range of
powers. They can order a firm to cease a wrongful act and ‘make
corrections’ (zeling gaizheng)166 within a specified time period,167

164 Labor Law art. 86; Labor Inspection Regulations art. 15; Labor Inspection
Implementing Provisions art. 26-29.
165 Labor Inspection Regulations art. 17.
166 Labor Law arts. 85 (general power to stop and rectify illegal acts); 89 (work
rules not in accordance with the law); 90 (working hours unlawfully
extended); 92 (breach of occupational health and safety requirements); 94
(illegal recruitment of minors); 95 (violation of special protection provisions
for women and minors); 98 (wrongful termination of, or delay in execution
of, employment contracts).
167 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Chufa Fa [Administrative
Punishments Law of the PRC], passed by the National People’s Congress 17th
March 1996 with effect from October 1, 1996, art. 23; Laodong Xingzheng
Chufa Ruogan Guiding [Certain Regulations on Administrative Punishments
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and order a firm to provide compensation for harm caused.168 They
can also impose an administrative penalty (or sanction, chufa). The
administrative punishments are warnings (jinggao), fines (fakuan),
confiscation of unlawful earnings (moshou weifa suode), orders to
cease business operations (zeling tingchan tingye) and revocation
of a permit (diaoxiao xukezheng).169 An additional sanction
with respect to Labor], promulgated September 27, 1996 with effect from
October 1, 1996, art. 6.
168 Labor Law art. 91 (arrears, embezzlement, non-payment of overtime,
payment below the minimum wage, and non-payment of termination
entitlements). A firm is liable for compensation to employees in many other
instances, although there is no explicit power for the labor department to
direct it to pay: arts. 89 (work rules not in accordance with law), 95 (violation
of special protection provisions for women and minors); 97 (labor contract
invalid through fault of the employer); 98 (wrongful termination of, or delay
in execution of employment contracts).
169 Laodong Xingzheng Chufa Ruogan Guiding [Certain Regulations concerning
Administrative Punishments with respect to Labor], promulgated by the
Ministry of Labor on 27th September, 1996 with effect from 1st October, 1996
art. 5). Fines can be imposed under the following provisions of the Labor
Law: arts 90 (working hours unlawfully extended), 92 (breach of
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provided for serious violations is publication of the conduct to
society at large.170 Criminal conduct should be referred to the
procuratorate.171

The scope of these penalties, and the principles governing their
imposition, are not spelt out in the Labor Law but in the Labor
Inspection Regulations and subordinate legal instruments produced
by the MOLSS. These clarify the amount of compensation that can
be ordered, the various punishments for breaches of the labor law

occupational health and safety requirements), 94 (illegal recruitment of
minors), 95 (violation of special protection provisions for women and
minors), 100 (failure to pay social insurance premiums), 101 (obstructing
departmental officers or retaliating against informants).
170 Labor Inspection Regulations, art 22.
171 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 35. For a discussion on the
merits of criminal procedures for serious occupational health and safety
breaches, see John Balzano Criminal Liability for Labor Safety Violations in
the People's Republic of China, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUDIES L. REV. 503
(2004).
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and the procedures for imposing those punishments.172 In cases of
underpayment of wages (including payment below the minimum
wage) and non-payment of overtime, labor officials can order a
firm to pay the worker the full amount owed within a specified
time, and, if the firm fails to comply, order it to pay an additional
50% to 100% of the outstanding amount.173 Where employers
unlawfully extend working hours, departmental officers may warn
the employer to comply with the law, order the employer to comply
and/or impose a fine of between 100 and 500 Yuan per worker.174

172 In relation to procedural requirements, see Labor Inspection Implementing
Provisions Chapter 5. These reflect the requirements of the Administrative
Punishments Law of the PRC, supra note 167.
173 Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 26. This expands on art. 91 of the Labor
Law. The Minimum Wage Regulations stipulate that an employer can be
ordered to pay compensation of up to five times the amount in arrears: supra
note 91, art. 13.
174 Labor Inspection Regulations, art 25. This corresponds to art. 90 of the
Labor Law.
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If the employer refuses to comply with departmental orders, the
fine escalates to between 2,000 and 20,000 Yuan.175

The analysis so far suggests that Chinese labor departments have
the authority and powers necessary to force employers to observe
the law. However, there are many factors blunting their potential
effectiveness.

Firstly, the disorderly state of legal rules means that local
agencies may give greater weight to rules or policies devised by
themselves or related agencies than to higher legal instruments,
which

formally

have

greater

authority.

Although

greater

consistency is being achieved, there is, as we have seen, still scope
for inconsistency.

Secondly, and more significantly, the sanctions that labor
departments can themselves deploy against egregious violators are
actually quite weak. Firms clearly orient their actions not simply on
175 Labor Inspection Regulations, art. 30.
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the basis of legality but, even more so, in accordance with costbenefit calculations. Sanctions need to be sufficiently powerful to
overcome incentives not to comply with the law. These incentives
are extremely strong in many Chinese firms. They face constant
pressure to lower their labor costs by illegal means, such as through
breaching labor contracts or compelling unreasonable hours.

Evasion of labor law by some firms creates immense pressure on
those others who might initially have a stronger disposition to abide
by the law. This cascade effect is well illustrated in China’s exportoriented manufacturing sector. If a firm in that hypercompetitive
environment is struggling to meet its supply deadlines, knows that
its rivals will require staff to work unreasonable hours, and knows
that they are very unlikely to be punished, it faces a choice between
adhering to the law and survival.176 Most firms are likely to choose
survival over a steadfast but suicidal commitment to the law. To be
sure, the imposition of codes of conduct on subcontractors by
enterprises at the top of global commodity chains, and other private
176 LIU & TAN, supra note 34, at 83–5.
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sector initiatives, creates a counterweight of sorts to these
incentives to evade the law, but evidence to date suggests that this
has not yet proved particularly effective.177

Firms using low-skilled migrant labor have been especially prone
to violate the law because their workers have, at least until recently,
been unable to use labor market pressures to compel the employer
to act lawfully. Threats to exit the firm unless the law is obeyed
have carried little weight because of China’s huge labor surplus,178
although recent unskilled labor shortages in certain cities may

177 As I have pointed out previously, it would seem that until there is a
fundamental change in the practice of MNEs, most factories in the sweatshop
industries will be awarded supply chain contracts on the basis of price,
quality and efficiency, not compliance with corporate social responsibility
initiatives: Sean Cooney, A Broader Role for the Commonwealth in
Eradicating Foreign Sweatshops?, 28 MELB. U. L. REV. 290, (2004), at. 318.
178 According to official estimates, there are 150 million surplus rural workers,
in addition to the more than 100 million migrant rural workers: Migrant
Workers Number 113.0 million in 2003, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May 15,
2004.
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indicate that many rural workers have at last decided that the poor
working conditions are unacceptable.179 Further, as discussed
below, industrial action to force compliance has no legal status or
protection and union officials (who are often also managers and/or
party officials) discourage it.180

In these circumstances, the economic incentives for noncompliance with the law need to be countered by credible legal
sanctions. These are generally not available to labor departments.
Where employers fail to heed formal warnings, or refuse to obey
correction orders, labor departments in most instances are limited
to imposing fines and compensation orders. The usefulness of these
measures is attenuated by the labor department’s reliance on
179 See e.g., Brian Ho, Is there a Migrant Labor Shortage in China? CSR ASIA
WEEKLY VOL 2 (8) (2006). These include claims that Guangdong Province
has a labor shortage of up to 1 million workers. The shortfall is partly
attributed to the poor wages and conditions in the areas experiencing the
shortfall and there is some evidence that market pressures are leading to
improvements in wages and conditions: id.
180 See infra notes 324 and accompanying text.
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judicial compulsory execution procedures to force unwilling firms
to pay.181

Consider their capacity to apply the following serious sanctions
available to many Chinese governmental agencies: cessation of
business,

confiscation

of

earnings,

revocation

of

license,

administrative detention of an employer and prosecution. With one
exception (revocation of a license to use non-standard working
hours systems),182 it would seem that the labor departments would
not be able to generally deploy these sanctions against cases of
underpayment of wages and unhealthy working hours. Under
nationally applicable regulations, explicit power to order business
181 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 44.
182 As we have seen, the law permits enterprises to establish non-standard
working hours systems, but these require permission of the labor department:
Labor Law art. 39; Working Hours Measures, supra note 124, arts. 4 and 5.
Neither of these measures explicitly enables the labor departments to revoke
such permits.

However, MOLSS departments have a general power to

suspend licenses: Certain Regulations on Administrative Punishments with
respect to Labor, supra note 167, art 5.
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operations to cease or to confiscate earnings is given to the labor
departments only in relation to job placement and training
agencies.183

The restriction on sanctions available to labor departments is
partly a consequence of important administrative reforms directed
at preventing bureaucratic agencies from arbitrarily inflicting a
wide range of punishments on individuals. Viewed from an
administrative law perspective, the restrictions seem appropriate in
a system where arbitrary action has been notorious. On the other
hand, an unfortunate by-product of these reforms in the labor
context is limiting the scope of credible threats that can be made to

183 Labor Inspection Regulations art. 28. Further, labor departments cannot
exercise the power to detain employers: Administrative Punishments Law art.
9. That power can be invoked where an employer’s failure to comply with the
labor department constitutes an offence against public order but it must be
exercised by the public security agencies: Labor Inspection Regulations art.
30. See also Labor Law art. 96, which applies where employers beat,
intimidate or detail workers. Labor departments are also unable to initiate
criminal prosecutions, as this is a matter for the procuratorate: id.
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a recalcitrant employer. Relatively effective enforcement strategies
often involve the ability to ‘escalate’ interventions.184

The Labor Law does set out circumstances (mostly connected
with health and safety) in which a firm may be shut down or
earnings confiscated by other authorities, such as the Department of
Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of Work Safety
or the Ministry of Health.185 Labor departments can therefore refer
serious cases to, or seek the assistance of, those other agencies.
However, this renders the enforcement process much more

184 See infra note 408 and accompanying text.
185 See e.g., Labor Law art. 92 (People’s Government can order a firm to close
down for work safety breaches) and art. 94 (Department of Industry and
Commerce can close firm for employing minors). Administrative detention
and criminal prosecutions are among the available sanctions for various
offences under the Work Safety Law, supra note 88, Chapter 6. Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Zhiyebing Yuzhi Fa [Law of the People's Republic of
China on the Prevention and Cure of Occupational Diseases], passed by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, promulgated October
27, 2001, entered into effect May 1, 2002.
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complex, as labor department officials need to secure the cooperation of the agencies, and thereby lose control of the
enforcement process. The other agencies may well have different
internal priorities, lack expertise in labor matters, and/or be
unwilling to devote resources to labor enforcement issues. Further,
there may also be jurisdictional disputes in which agencies either
seek to intervene differently over the same issue or seek to pass the
buck to each other. For example, as we have seen, working hours is
an issue managed chiefly by labor departments but it can also be
constructed as a question of workplace safety and health; these are
matters

that

fall

within

the

responsibility

of

the

State

Administration for Workplace Safety and the Ministry of Health,
both of which have greater coercive powers.

Third, while, as we have also seen, employees individually and
collectively

are

entitled

to

lodge

complaints

with

labor

departments, it is difficult for them to compel a department to
pursue a case where it is unwilling to devote resources to it.
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Labor inspectors have considerable discretion to dismiss
complaints if they consider them trivial or already remedied, or
cannot substantiate them.186 They can also do so if the complaint is
made more than two years after the violation, if the employees are
unable to identify the correct employer (which may be difficult in
the context of complex supply chains) or if labor department
considers the matter is outside its jurisdiction.187

The steady improvements in administrative law mean that
employees can seek both administrative and judicial review of a
decision not to pursue a labor complaint. Administrative review
(xingzheng fuyi) extends to review of both the lawfulness and
appropriateness of matters pertaining to remuneration and hours of
work.188 Review can either be sought from the local labor

186 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions art. 35.
187 Id. art. 18.
188 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa [Law of the People's
Republic of China on Administrative Review] passed by the Standing
Committee of the National People’s Congress and promulgated on April 29,
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department concerned or – more usefully – the labor department at
the next higher level in the administrative hierarchy.189 Judicial
review of administrative action, or administrative litigation
(xingzheng susong) against a labor department is also possible
where the department has failed to perform its duty under the labor
law to protect employee rights or has failed to respond to a
complaint.190

1999 with effect from October 1, 1999. This Law is reflected in the Laodong
he Shehui Baozhang Xingzheng Fuyi Banfa [Measures on Administrative
Reconsideration with respect to Labor and Social Security], promulgated by
the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on November 23, 1999, with effect
from that date; see in particular arts. 1, 3(6).
189 Id. art. 6.
190 The Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 66, enables a citizen to
commence court proceedings where an agency has ‘refused to perform its
statutory duty’: art. 11(5) and a court can require an agency to perform its
duty within a stipulated time period: art. 54 (3).
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Unfortunately, administrative review and administrative litigation
are neither well-used to secure compliance with a statutory duty191
nor particularly effective.192 Administrative review is hampered by
the unwillingness of agencies to accept complaints and to correct
improper decisions, often as a result of local political or economic
pressures, and lack of proper procedures. Administrative litigation
is restricted by the inability of the courts to invalidate
administrative rules, and by the generally conservative approach
taken by courts to the scope of their review powers. Both processes
are impeded by lack of public knowledge about, or fear of, legal

191 There was a total of 75,918 applications for administrative review in 2003:
Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [China Legal Yearbook] 2004, 1071-1073. Only 3%
of all cases (not just labor cases) related to failure to perform a statutory
function (2,210 in the entire country) and in only 1% (659 cases) was an
order made to perform a function: id. at 1072. These statistics also show that
there were 44, 587 cases of administrative litigation in 2003.. Less than 2%
of these cases (659) concerned failure to perform a statutory function and
only 135 cases resulted in an order to perform.
192 See e.g., Biddulph, supra note 52, at 226-256 (focusing on review of
policing decisions); PEERENBOOM supra note 51, at 399-424.
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procedures, compounded by failure of agencies to inform citizens
of their remedies (despite being legally obliged to do so).193

Moreover, in so far as administrative law reforms have some use,
it is employers rather than employees who are best placed to take
advantage of them. Unscrupulous employers may invoke them to
stall and dissuade labor departments from implementing the law.
Thus, where a labor department proposes to order a firm to cease
operations, or revoke a license, or impose a large fine, it must, at its
own expense, arrange for a hearing in which the parties enjoy
extensive procedural rights, including a right to representation.194
Administrative penalties can be challenged either through

193 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 418.
194 Laodong Xingzheng Chufa Tingzheng Chengyu Guiding [Regulation on
Hearing Procedures for Administrative Punishments with respect to Labor],
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor on September 27, 1996 with effect
from October 1, 1996. ‘Large fines’ (jiao da shu fakuan) are not defined in
this instrument. However, it would not include a fine of 1,000 yuan or less, in
respect of which ‘on the spot’ procedures can be used: id. arts. 33-34.
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administrative review or administrative litigation;195 failure to
comply with procedures even in less serious cases can lead to
invalidation of the penalty,196 an obligation to compensate the
firm197 and/or sanctions being imposed on labor department
officers rather than the firm.198 It is understandable that
inexperienced departmental officers, lacking legal qualifications
and often lacking resources, may be reluctant to challenge an
employer prepared to exhaust its legal options.

195.Almost half of all applications for administrative review related to
admin istrative punishments: Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [China Legal
Yearbook] 2004, 1072
196 Administrative Punishments Law, supra note 167, arts. 6 and 35. Note that
the penalty is not suspended pending review and litigation: id art. 45; Labor
Inspection Implementing Provisions, art. 42.
197 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Peichang Fa [Law of the
People's Republic of China on State Compensation] (passed by the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress on May 12, 1994, with effect
from January 1, 1995.
198 Id. art. 44.
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Fourth, corruption and local protectionism can set the prevailing
agenda for the bureaucracy.199 In accordance with Chinese
administrative practice,200 local labor departments have ‘two
masters’: they are subordinate both to higher level units of their
ministry (the MOLSS) (the vertical or tiao relationship)201 and to
the provincial congress and government of the area in which they
operate (the horizontal or kuai relationship). Since labor
departments are staffed and funded by local governments, it is often
these that have the upper hand in directing the day-to-day work of

199 Feng Ye, The Chinese Procuratorate and the Anti-corruption Campaigns in
the People's Republic of China, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 117-8 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002); Andrew
Wederman, The Intensification of Corruption in China, 180 THE CHINA
QUARTERLY 895 (2004).
200 Benjamin van Rooij, China's System of Public Administration, in
IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 323, 329-331,
341-2 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002).
201 Labor Inspection Regulations, supra note 151, art. 7.
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departmental officers.202 Local governments often have close links
to businesses under scrutiny or indeed manage those businesses.203
Admittedly, complainants are able to request that labor inspectors
handling their case be replaced if they face a conflict of interest but
the decision is an internal matter for the department.204

Fifth, the quality and quantity of labor inspectors may well be
inadequate to implement the law systematically across the

202 Benjamin van Rooij, Implementing Chinese Environmental Law through
Enforcement, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA 164-8 (Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002), at 330.
203 TAYLOR ET AL, supra note 25, at 43-45. Taylor at al comment that expansion
of private businesses is a mark of a local government’s success, providing
that social stability is maintained at a minimum level and no serious unrest
occurs: id. at 44; SARGENSON, supra note 45, at 39-41. Compare Van Rooij,
supra note 202, at 162-163.
204 Labor Inspection Implementing Provisions arts. 23-25. This decision could
presumably be subject to administrative review or litigation.
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country.205 As to quality, the qualifications for labor inspectors are
minimal; the only substantive requirement is that an inspector must
have engaged in labor administrative work for at least three years
and must have undertaken a training program.206 As to quantity,
while there are more than 3,000 inspecting agencies and 40,000
labor inspectors,207 this number is dwarfed by the number of
business entities in China – around 30 million.208

205 Compare also van Rooij’s analysis of environmental protection officers,
supra note 202.
206 Laodong Jianchayuan GuanliBanfa [Measures on the Management of Labor
Inspectors], issued by the Ministry of Labor November 14, 1994 with effect
from January 1, 1995, art. 7. Inspectors must undergo a re-qualification
examination procedure every three years: id. art 12.
207 Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [Law Yearbook of China] 2003 at 45. These figures
are from 2001; the exact number of agencies reported in that year is 3174.
The 2004 Yearbook does not contain updated figures.
208 See KANAMORI, supra note 25, at 24. More than 90% of these are privately
operated in one form or another: id. Not all of these enterprises are employers
– the statistics do not indicate which proportion of firms has employees.
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Finally, despite the potential sanctions for so doing, firms adopt
extensive strategies to frustrate inspection work. For example, in
the event that bribes do not succeed, many firms keep false records
and coach workers so that when an external inspection into
working hours and other conditions takes place, the inspectors are
deceived.209

C E N FO R C IN G

TH E

R U L ES : D IS P U TE R E S O LU TIO N

PROCEDURES

The shortcomings in bureaucratic enforcement render it all the
more important for workers to be able to enforce their rights
through formal dispute resolution processes.210 This form of
enforcement process enables workers to be directly engaged in
209 LIU & TAN, supra note 34, at 76-79; CHAN, supra note 2, at 123-125.
210 Two excellent studies on this topic are HO, supra note, 75 (in English), and
SHANGYUAN

ZHENG,

LAODONG

ZHENGYI

CHULI

CHENGXUFA

DE

XIANDAIHUA [The Modernisation of Labor Adjustment Procedure Law] (in
Chinese).
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seeking compliance. When a complaint is referred to a labor
department, workers lose control of it, in the sense that as we have
seen labor departments cannot be readily compelled to act in
workers’ interests. On the other hand, dispute resolution procedures
constitute workers as parties, with the ability to structure the claim
and pursue the issue to conclusion.

The centerpiece of the Chinese labor dispute resolution process is
labor arbitration. According to the Labor Law, all formal disputes
that cannot be resolved by mediation within an enterprise211 should
be channeled through arbitration. Arbitration is an essential
precondition, not an alternative, to litigation.212 A worker cannot
211 Intra-firm mediation is rapidly declining as an effective mode of dispute
resolution, especially in private firms: Mary Gallagher, '"Use the Law as Your
Weapon" Institutional Change and Legal Mobilization in China' in
ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY AND POSSIBILITIES FOR
JUSTICE (Neil Diamant, Stanley Lubman and Kevin O'Brien eds, 2005) at
67-70; Hualing Fu & D.W. Choy, From Mediation to Adjudication; Settling
Labor Disputes in China, 3 CHINA RIGHTS FORUM 17, 18 (2004).
212 Labor Law art. 83.
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directly file suit in a court, even for a claim for unpaid wages (a
simple debt) without first going through arbitration.213

Labor arbitration operates as follows. Where a labor dispute first
occurs, a worker or an employer may apply for mediation within
the enterprise.214 If mediation fails or if one of the parties is
unwilling to have the dispute mediated, one or both of the parties
may apply for labor arbitration.215 Labor arbitrations (which
usually often involve their own mediation phase)216 are conducted
213 GUAN, supra note 94, at 531; ZHENG, supra note 210 at 146-149. Zheng
regards this precondition as an incursion into a citizen’s right to litigate.
214 Labor Law art. 79. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Laodong Zhengyi
Chuli Tiaoli [Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Settlement of
Labor Disputes in Enterprises], promulgated by the State Council on July 6,
1993, entered into effect August 1, 1993 [hereafter Dispute Regulations], art.
6.
215 Labor Law art. 79; Dispute Regulations art. 6.
216 The proportion of cases settled by LDAC mediation has been in steep
decline; less than 30% of cases were resolved by mediation in 2002: Fu &
Choy, supra note 211, at 19.
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by tripartite labor dispute arbitration committees (laodong zhengyi
zhongcai weiyuanhui, ‘LDAC’s), established by the local labor
departments.217

The LDACs (of which there are close to 3,000)218 have, on
paper, very wide jurisdiction. This extends to disputes over wages
by present and former employees and to disputes over working
hours.219 The LDACs also have broad powers to rule on the

217 Labor Law arts. 81; Dispute Regulations art. 12. Individual cases are heard
by arbitration tribunals (zhongcaiting) consisting of individual arbitrators or,
in more complicated cases, three arbitrators. A major case may be referred to
the entire committee for determination: Dispute Regulations art. 16. LDAC
Rules art. 21
218 There were 2,934 in 2003 according to the Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [Law
Yearbook of China] 2004, at 603.
219 Labor disputes are broadly defined to cover a range of matters in connection
with an employment relationship. The scope of a labor dispute is set out in
the Dispute Regulations. Art. 2 provides that the term ‘labor disputes’
includes disputes between enterprises and employees in China in relation to
(1) terminations, lay-offs and resignations; (2) wages, insurance, welfare,
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validity of a contract, order reinstatement of a terminated
employee, order the payment of compensation and/or require
employers to comply with labor contracts.220

More and more labor disputes are being brought before
LDACs.221 According to statistics from the MOLSS,222 the
training and labor protection (including hours); (3) the performance of labor
contracts; and (4) other disputes as defined in other laws or regulations. The
labor dispute procedure applies to disputes where a labor relationship has
existed, notwithstanding that no contract has been concluded: art.1, Supreme
People’s Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra note 68. See also
HO, supra note 75 at 77-78 (noting that disputes involving independent
contractor and analogous arrangements fall outside the purview of the
procedures).
220 The powers are not specifically set out in the Labor Law or in the Dispute
Regulations but are implicit in the LDAC’s ability to resolve disputes through
arbitration within its jurisdiction. On the kinds of orders that LDACs make,
see JOSEPHS, supra note 77, at 90-95.
221 For a comprehensive analysis of labor dispute occurrence and types, see Ho,
supra note 75 at 82-143. See also Gallagher, supra note 211; Thireau & Hua,
supra note 161.
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number of new cases has been rising yearly, from 47, 951 in 1996
to 226,391 in 2003, an increase of more than 470% in just seven
years.223 The vast majority of these cases are filed by employees
rather than employers.224 The number of workers involved has also
jumped from less than two hundred thousand to more than eight
hundred thousand.225 In 2003, more than 60% of cases concerned
disputes in the private sector.226 Further, more than one third of all

222 Not entirely reliable (figures do not always tally with each other), although
they probably do indicate general trends.
223 Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian [Yearbook of Labor Statistics] 2004
Table 9-1. The number of collective disputes has risen from 3150 in 1996 to
10823 in 2003, an increase of 340%.
224 Id. 215,512 or 95%.
225 Id. In 1996, there were 189,120 workers involved. This increased more than
420% to 801,042 in 2003.
226 Id. Table 9-2. In 2003, there were 141,465 cases in various forms of nonstate enterprise, 48,771 in state-owned enterprises and 30,218 in collectivelyowned enterprises. Of the 801, 042 workers involved in labor dispute cases in
2003, 416, 472, or 52% were from the state sector. See Gallagher, supra note
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labor arbitrations concern remuneration.227 MOLSS figures show
that just under half of cases in 2003 proceeded to arbitration, the
remainder being settled either by mediation or ‘other means’ (qita
fangshi).228 In any case, MOLSS asserts that almost all matters
(92%) were resolved within a year,229 that around half of the
matters were resolved solely in the employee’s favor and that in
35% of cases both parties were partly successful.230

These statistics suggest that, from an employee perspective,
LDACs are operating very effectively. Yet something is seriously
awry. Although the statistics are inconsistent, it would seem that a
211, at 63-65 on why there seem to be proportionately fewer disputes brought
from state-owned enterprises.
227 Zhongguo Laodong Tongji Nianjian [Yearbook of Labor Statistics] 2004
Table 9-2. 76.774 cases in 2003 (34%); of which 65% were in the non-state
sector.
228 Id. 95, 772 or 42% went to arbitration.
229 Id. Only 19,164 of the cases were not settled by the end of 2003.
230 Id. 109,556 cases were won (shangsu) by employees, 34,272 by employers
and in 79, 475 cases both parties won (shuangfang bufen shangsu).
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majority of cases are appealed from arbitration.231 One reason for
this appears to be that many LDACs reject cases because of an
excessively narrow view of their jurisdiction – perhaps to lower
their workload by shifting cases to the courts – but the courts then
take them up.232 Another is that a very high proportion of arbitral
judgments are appealed.233 A third reason is that litigants are
seeking to have arbitral awards enforced by the courts.234

231

HO, supra note 75 at 79. Some data suggests that statistics report that the
number of labor disputes taken to the courts actually exceeds that taken to
arbitration, which is impossible. According to the Zhongguo Falü Nianjian
[Law Yearbook of China] 2004, at 125, there were almost one hundred
thousand labor disputes litigated in 2003.

232 Gallagher, supra note 211, at 62; Thireau & Hua, supra note 161, at 87. Note
that this practice is conflict with Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on
Labor Disputes art. 1: see supra note 68.
233 Gallagher reports officials in Beijing and Shanghai indicating that in 2003,
nearly 70% of all judgments were appealed, supra note 211, at 73.
234 Id. at 74.
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The high rate of court applications suggests that Chinese labor
arbitration has serious weaknesses. This impression is confirmed by
the comprehensive critique of the system by Chinese labor law
scholar, Zheng Shang-yuan.235 Professor Zheng firstly observes
that the present labor dispute resolution processes were conceived
in the era when the economy was much more centrally planned and
dominated by the state sector than it is today. They remain highly
bureaucratized (xingzhenghua), with the labor departments as the
central actors.236 The LDACs, while formally separate entities
which are authorized to ‘settle labor disputes independently
according to law’,237 are chaired by a labor department
representative,238 located within the labor dispute settlement

235 ZHENG, supra note 210.
236 Id. 137-141.
237 Art. 2 of the Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Guize [Organic
Rules of Labor Dispute Arbitration Committees] (hereafter LDAC Rules),
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor, November 5, 1993 with immediate
effect.
238 Labor Law art. 81; Dispute Regulations art. 13.
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section of the department,239 and dependent on the department for
administrative work.240 Moreover, the LDACs do not have the
status of legal persons, do not have their own assets or control over
their financial operations, and cannot pay the wages and benefits of
their members. This means in effect that the full-time arbitrators
must be employees of the labor departments.241 This position may
be contrasted with that of commercial arbitration bodies.242

239 Dispute Regulations art. 13.
240 Id. LDAC Rules art. 3.
241 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 154. LDAC Rules art. 15. However, LDACs can
charge arbitration fees: Dispute Regulations art. 34. The LDAC Rules
provide that LDAC operating costs are to be met through arbitration fees and
‘financial supplements’: art. 24. This article also provides that LDACs are to
have separate funds for their own use; in view of Professor Zheng’s
comments, it is not clear that this occurs in practice.
242 See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhongcai Fa [Arbitration Law of the
People's Republic of China](hereafter Arbitration Law), passed by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, August 31, 1994,
with effect from September 1, 1995. Art 8 provides that ‘arbitration shall be
carried out independently according to law and shall be free from interference
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Further, although LDACs are ostensibly based on the principle of
tripartism and should be comprised of state, employer and
employee

representatives,

in

practice

state

representatives

dominate.243 We have just seen that the labor department
representative is the chair of a LDAC. The ‘employer’
representative is nominated by government agencies responsible
for administrating state owned enterprises;244 this means that
despite the growing private sector of the economy, there is no
engagement in the dispute resolution process by private employers.
On the other hand, the ‘employee’ representative is drawn from the
quasi-governmental official trade union organization.245 In any

of administrative organs, social organizations or individuals.’ Art 14 provides
that ‘arbitration commissions shall be independent from administrative
organs and there shall be no subordinate relationships between arbitration
commissions and administrative organs.’
243 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 150-153.
244 LDAC Rules art. 7. See also ZHENG, supra note 210, at 151-152.
245 LDAC Rules art 7. See also ZHENG, supra note 210, at 153.
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event, these ‘non-state’ representatives may not be present in many
of these cases, which can be heard by individual arbitrators.246

Under these conditions, labor arbitration crosses over into
bureaucratic implementation of the law, rather than constituting an
autonomous dispute resolution procedure. Professor Zheng writes:

This model under which the administration is responsible
for arbitration readily blurs the distinctions between
bureaucrats and arbitrators, and between the formulation
and implementation of policy. [ …] To a certain extent,
administrative guidance, order-making, and unilateral
compulsion are in conflict with detachment, fairness,
balance and trust necessary for arbitration.247

246 Union representatives were involved in only 30,396 of the cases in 2003:
Zhongguo Falü Nianjian [Law Yearbook of China] 2004, 603.
247 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 139. See also at 204-205 (commenting that
bureaucratic behaviors may intimidate parties and cause them to lose
confidence in the process).
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Associated with this bureaucratization of arbitration is the low
competence of many of the arbitrators.248 The main qualification
for arbitrators is that they have engaged in labor dispute resolution
work for more than three years or in related work for more than
five years.249 There is an exam but it is not difficult to pass.250
Although there is provision for scholars and lawyers to serve
concurrently as arbitrators,251 full-time arbitrators must be
nominated from staff of the labor dispute section of the labor
department252 and many of these are transferees from other parts of
the labor bureaucracy or retired army personnel.253

248 Id. at 154-158.
249 LDAC Rules art. 16(4).
250 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 157.
251 Dispute Regulations art. 15
252 LDAC Rules art 15.
253 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 156.
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A further problem is that, although the published statistics suggest
that employees receive a fair hearing, LDAC arbitrators face strong
incentives to be biased against them. The law provides that they
must recuse themselves if they have a conflict of interest and are
prohibited from taking bribes.254 However, LDACs are often
predisposed to favor local government and local business interests
(often intertwined) to the detriment of individual workers.255 This
may be because of corrupt financial inducements, but the structural
reason why LDACs would not wish to offend local governments is
that, as we have seen, they are dependent on labor departments for
their resources and personnel, and those departments are in turn
dependent on local governments for their resources and personnel.

Finally, LDACs do not have jurisdiction where there is not an
employer-employee relationship. As we have seen, Chinese labor
law does not explain in detail how to identify such a relationship;
this leaves scope for the LDACs to determine it for themselves. As
254 Dispute Regulations arts. 35 and 38.
255 Gallagher, supra note 211, at 74.
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mentioned above, many LDACs take a very narrow view of their
jurisdiction256 – perhaps to reduce their workload – and are
therefore likely to dismiss cases from workers who do not have a
clearly identifiable employer. These workers may be the most
vulnerable to violation of their contractual entitlements or their
rights to safe working conditions.

Turning from the status and composition of the LDACs to
questions of process, a first problem is that a party (usually the
employer) is able draw out a dispute until the other party is
exhausted.257 The relevant procedural rules require an LDAC to
determine whether to accept an application within seven days of
receiving it.258 If the LDAC does accept the application, it has a

256 For example, through rejecting cases where there is a labor relationship
without written contracts: see supra note 219.
257 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 201-204.
258 Dispute Regulations art. 25. If a LDAC declines to hear a matter on the basis
that it does not constitute a labor dispute, a court can exercise jurisdiction
over the matter if it determines either that it does constitute a labor dispute, or
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maximum of 104 days within which to conclude the case.259 The
arbitral award takes effect within fifteen days of service on the
parties.260 Note at this point that, with respect to the two labor
abuses which are the focus of the article, this kind of process is
likely to be much more relevant to remuneration issues than to
hours of work (which require prompt and direct intervention in the
workplace when the breach is occurring).

However, even with respect to remuneration, the procedure is
problematic. If one of the parties is dissatisfied with the arbitral
award, it can elect to commence court proceedings. This
immediately prevents the arbitrated award from taking effect.261
The court process involves a de novo hearing at first instance, and
then, if there is an appeal of the first instance judgment, a second

because it otherwise has jurisdiction: Supreme Court Interpretation on Labor
Disputes, supra note 68, art. 2.
259 Dispute Regulations arts. 25 and 32.
260 Id. art. 30.
261 Supreme Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra note 68, art. 17.
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de novo hearing.262 Professor Zheng points out that this process
places workers seeking to recover arrears in wages in a highly
disadvantageous position; they not only face the prospect of
maintaining legal proceedings without their primary source of
income (especially if they have been wrongly terminated), they also
run the risk of the employer absconding, or removing assets from
the jurisdiction.263 In the case of court proceedings, it is possible to
obtain preventative orders, such as orders to preserve property and
evidence.264 Most usefully, a court can order interim relief,
including, specifically, in cases involving labor remuneration.265
Such orders can not be made by LDACs.266

262 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa [Civil Procedure Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (hereafter Civil Procedure Law) promulgated
by the National People’s Congress, April 9 1991, Chapters XII –XIV.
263 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 167-170. See also the discussion in Ho, supra
note 75 at 154-158 on fees and the availability of legal aid.
264 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 262, Chapters VI and IX.
265 Id. arts. 97 and 98.
266 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 166-170.
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Not surprisingly, then, LDACs appear to be rarely used by
migrant workers. Research by Thireau and Hua of data at the
Shenzhen Labor Bureau suggests that LDACs are used to resolve
disputes by wealthier, long-term, and frequently skilled workers.267
Other research suggests that these workers are overwhelmingly
well-resourced males.268 On the other hand, poorer workers use
oral or written complaints to the labor department as their principle
means of trying to engage state institutions to deal with labor
abuses.269

267 Thireau & Hua, supra note 161, at 90. See also JOSEPHS, supra note 77, at
92-94. Thireau and Hua, based on Shenzhen data in the late 1990s, estimate
the cost of arbitration proceedings at 2,361 yuan, or around four times the
monthly wage of migrant workers lodging complaints with the labor
departments:. Gallagher arrives at a much lower figure in Shanghai: 300
yuan: Gallagher, supra note 211, at 59.
268 Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at 19.
269 Thireau & Hua, supra note 161, at 90.
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The LDAC procedures may be contrasted to commercial
arbitration where courts can make interim relief orders while
arbitration proceedings are on foot270 and where arbitral awards
cannot be appealed against on substantive grounds.271 Judicial
review of commercial arbitration is possible only on procedural
grounds.272

Even if a worker can sustain the expenses associated with an
arbitration and/or court proceeding, and obtains an order in her or
his favor,273 this may be of little avail. It is often very difficult in
China to execute either arbitral awards or court judgments. As
application for execution of arbitral awards involves court
proceedings, in both cases the difficulty lies with the court
compulsory execution process. It is well established that Chinese
270 Arbitration Law art. 28.
271 Arbitration Law arts. 5 and 9.
272 Arbitration Law Chapter 5.
273 Employees win a majority of court cases in many significant provinces, such
as Guangdong: Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at 21.
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courts are frequently unable to enforce their judgments.274 In an
extensive study of the enforcement of civil judgments, Clarke
identifies reluctance by courts to use coercive measures (especially
where a defendant may not be seen as entirely at fault morally),
lack of interest in execution, lack of finality in judgments,
insolvency through enterprise restructuring, lack of cooperation by
banks and reluctance by courts to execute against enterprises if it
will lead to adverse consequences such as job losses as factors
contributing to the problem.275 However, the factor that may be
most serious is, again, local protectionism. This leads to courts
deferring to the wishes of local elites and refusing to assist courts

274 Donald Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: the
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1 (1996); Jianfu
Chen, Mission Impossible: Judicial Efforts to Enforce Civil Judgments and
Rulings, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 85
(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002).
275 Clarke, supra note 274, at 35-40, 52-68.
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from other parts of China enforce their judgments within the
jurisdiction.276

A third problem is that the time limit within which claims may be
brought to LDACs is unreasonably short. The Labor Law provides
that a party must file with an LDAC within 60 days of the
occurrence of a labor dispute.277 This is a very short period and
many workers are likely to remain unaware of it until it has
expired.278

A fourth procedural flaw is that labor arbitration is not subject to
judicial supervision.279 As a court hears a labor dispute de novo as
though it were an ordinary civil dispute, it does not concern itself
with the conduct of the arbitration – that is irrelevant, so it is unable
276 Id. at 41-52. See also LUBMAN, supra note 51, at 266-268.
277 Labor Law art. 82; Supreme Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra
note 68, art. 3.
278 Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at 19-20.
279 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 175-178
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to upbraid a LDAC for its poor adherence to process.280 Moreover,
it would seem that administrative litigation proceedings cannot be
invoked against a LADC.281 Thus, if members of a LADC refuse
to recuse themselves despite a conflict of interest, or refuse to hear

280 The position is therefore the opposite of commercial arbitration. John Mo,
Probing the Uniformity of the Arbitration System in the PRC, 17(3) J. INT’L
ARB. 1, 46-48 (2000).
281 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 233-234. It is not possible to commence
administrative litigation against a LDAC on the basis that it has failed to
make a decision or that it refuses to accept a case: Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
guanyu Laodong Zhongcai Weiyuanhui Yuqi bu Zuochu Zhongcai Caijue
huozhe bu Yu Shouli Tongzhi de Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Renmin Fayuan
Yingfou Shouli de Pifu [Reply by the Supreme People’s Court concerning
Whether the People’s Courts Can Accept Labor Dispute Cases Where the
Labor Arbitration Committee Has Failed to Issue a Decision within Time or
Has Failed to Accept a Case], Fashi 24 of 1998, issued September 9, 1998.
While a party can commence a civil procedure if a LADC declines to hear a
matter, it is not explicitly clear that a court can exercise jurisdiction if an
LADC simply fails to make a decision within the required time period: see
Supreme People’s Court Interpretation on Labor Disputes, supra note 68
, art.
2.
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important evidence, a party to the proceedings is unable to compel
them to do so. They may be subject to administrative sanctions
only.282

Yet another procedural shortcoming is that the legal instruments
regulating dispute resolution generally draw no procedural
distinctions between individual and collective disputes. This is a
legacy of central planning where industrial conflict did not take the
same form as collective disputes in market-based economies.283
This means that the LDACs use the same procedures for a small
individual dispute and a large-scale conflict that may involve
considerable economic and social disruption, for instance where a
factory suddenly closes, leaving thousands of workers unpaid.

To be sure, a distinction is made between collective disputes over
vested rights and collective interest disputes, but it is of a negative

282 Dispute Regulations art. 38. LDAC Rules art. 26.
283 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 141-146, 207-216.
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kind. Disputes arising out of collective negotiation284 are excluded
from the jurisdiction of the LDAC.285 Where collective
negotiations break down, disputes are referred to labor departments
directly for assistance, not to the LDACs. The LDACs only handle
collective disputes arising out of the performance of a collective
contract (i.e. vested rights).286

As far as court proceedings are concerned,287 there is no special
labor law court or procedure288 and so labor cases are frequently
treated the same as other civil (or sometimes administrative)
284 This is not collective bargaining: see Simon Clarke et al., Collective
Consultation and Industrial Relations in China, 42 BRITISH JOURNAL OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 235 (2004)
285 Labor Law art. 84. Jiti Hetong Guiding [Provisions on Collective Contract],
promulgated by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security on January 20,
2004, with effect from May 1, 2004, Chapter 7.
286 Id. art. 55.
287 For more extensive accounts of the Chinese court system, see PEERENBOOM,
supra note 51, at 280-342; LUBMAN, supra note 51, at 250-297.
288 Labor cases are handled under the Civil Procedure Law, supra note 262.
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disputes. While judges in the advanced coastal provinces may be
familiar with the distinct nature of employment and industrial
relations law, in other parts of the countries lack of specialization is
problematic, especially when generalist judges encounter cases
involving very serious industrial conflict.289 Moreover, Professor
Zheng points out that many courts treat labor cases with disdain
because they are time consuming and, the employee litigants
generate little income for the court from fees.290

289 Judges, prosecutors and lawyers generally have a very low understanding of
labor law, and especially those aspects concerning trade unions: LIU CHENG,
LUN GONGHUI DE DAIBIAO SUSONGQUAN [A Discussion of the Trade Union’s
Right to Representative Litigation], paper delivered to the International
Seminar on Labor Dispute Settlement, Peking University, 19th-20th
November, 2004 (on file with the author).
290 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 244-247; see also Fu & Choy, supra note 211, at
21.
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Like

LDACs,

courts

are

plagued

by

problems

of

incompetence,291 although the quality of judges is improving in
wake of moves to set higher qualifications and standards for judges
on the part of the NPC and the Supreme People’s Court.292 On the
other hand, corruption appears to be increasing. In a further
manifestation of the ubiquitous institutional flaw - local
protectionism - lower courts are financially dependent on their
local governments, and the appointment and removal of their
judges is controlled by local people’s congresses. As with the labor
departments and the LDACs, courts are very vulnerable to local
pressure.293 They may either find in favor of the local financial
interest, regardless of the merits, or delay making a decision
adverse to that interest.294

291 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 289-298, 320-323; Yuwen Li, Court Reform
in China: Problems, Progress and Prospects, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 69

(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2002).

292 Li, supra note 291, at 72-76, 82-83.
293 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 307-312. Li, supra note 291, at 59.
294 Li, supra note 291, at 60-62.
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Finally, court proceedings are expensive and there is inadequate
legal aid for persons (such as individual workers) without means
who wish to access lawyers,295 although more worker assistance
organizations are gradually being established.296

D E N FO R C IN G

TH E

R U L ES : U N IO N S

Individual workers confront serious obstacles in attempting to
enforce labor law through engaging state enforcement and dispute
resolution processes. Shortcomings in labor bureaucracies and
dispute procedures are, of course, observed in very many
jurisdictions. Nonetheless, in many countries, the injurious effects
such shortcomings have on workers are counteracted by workers’
capacity to pursue compliance issues collectively, through their

295 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51
, at 362 -364. See also id. at 361-369 on access
to competent and honest lawyers. Li, supra note 291, at 61-62.
296 See infra note 418.
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unions. In China, however, the extent to which lawful trade unions
are responsible for compelling compliance with the law is
determined by the state, not by ordinary union members. The
compliance function of Chinese unions is thus really another aspect
of state bureaucratic enforcement of labor law. Let us examine how
far this compliance function contributes to the implementation of
labor law.

China’s official trade union organization, the All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), is the largest ‘labor
organization’ in the world, claiming a membership of over 130
million, more than 300,000 full time officials and more than one
and a half million base-level (that is, enterprise) unions.297
However, the ACFTU is not an organization controlled by its
membership. It is subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party

297 See ACFTU website <http://www.acftu.org.cn/about.htm>. This states that
the membership is 134 million and that there are 1, 713, 000 primary trade
unions.
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(CCP) and the state.298 This arrangement is spelt out both in the
Trade Union Law299 and in the ACFTU Charter.300 The preamble
to the Charter provides that:
Chinese trade unions are mass organizations of the working
class formed voluntary by workers under the leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party. They are a bridge and bond linking the
party to the working masses. They are an important social pillar
of national political power and a representative of the interests of
members and workers.301

Furthermore, the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ ensures that
lower level unions remain subordinate to higher-level entities,

298 See e.g., TAYLOR AT AL, supra note 25, at 40-43, 102-123.
299 Trade Union Law art. 4.
300 Zhongguo Gonghui Guicheng [Charter of Chinese Unions] (hereafter the
Charter), passed by the 14th National Congress of the ACFTU on September
26, 2003.
301 Id.

124

culminating in the national ACFTU leadership.302 Although the
Charter provides for enterprise-level union committees to be
elected by members (and direct elections are apparently
increasing)303 the elected candidates are subject to approval of
higher-level union officials.304

Despite the fact that the ACFTU is recognized as a trade union
organization by the ILO,305 its subordination to the CCP has led

302 Trade Union Law art. 9; Charter art. 9 Of course many unions in liberal
democracies have rules that enable a national elected body to override a local
constituent union, but they do not normally provide for control over local
electoral processes.
303 Grassroots Trade Unions Elect Own Leaders, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, May
8,

2005:

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-

05/08/content_2931894.htm>.
304 Trade Union Charter art. 27.
305 A nominee of the ACFTU is currently a deputy member of the Workers’
Group

in

the

ILO

Governing

Body:

<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/refs/pdf/gbmember.pdf
>.
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the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions to conclude
that it is not a free and democratic trade union:

A government created and controlled union that has to
uphold policies adopted by the government cannot at the
same time credibly represent workers’ interests.306

As is well known, China does not permit unions to be formed
without ACFTU approval307 and has harshly punished labor
activists who have attempted to do so.308 This is clearly in

306 See International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, 'ICFTU Comments
on the First Report submitted by the People's Republic of China in its
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 1966 (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions,
2005) at 1.1.2.
307 Trade Union Law art. 11.
308 ICFTU, supra note 306, at Appendix 3.
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violation of the key ILO conventions on freedom of association,309
as the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association has repeatedly
found.310 Despite this, there is very little prospect that China will
substantially alter its stance on freedom of association in the short
to medium term as the party-state sees dominance of labor
organizations as essential to its survival.311

The law, then, binds Chinese trade unions to the CCP and the
state through the ACFTU structure and treats worker representative
bodies outside this structure as illegal. However, the law goes
beyond simply ensuring that the CCP/state have ultimate authority

309 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention
(ILO No 87) July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S 17; Right to Organize and Collective
Bargaining Convention (ILO No 98), July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S 257.
310 See e.g., ILO Committee on Freedom of Association Reports Vol. LXXXVI,
2003, Series B, No. 1 at 385-467, especially paragraph 465.
311 See ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 128-45
(1999) on the interaction between China and the ILO on freedom of
association.
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over trade unions; it directs what functions the unions are to
perform. It treats them essentially as state regulatory agencies.

Among these mandated functions, a major responsibility of the
trade unions is to seek employer compliance with the labor law.
While this function was formerly expressed in vague terms,312 the
2001 amendments to the Trade Union Law delineate specifically
the areas in which unions are supposed to be particularly vigilant of
employee rights and entitlements.313 Trade unions, for example,
are obligated to (yingdang) take action ‘on behalf of employees’
where enterprises misappropriate wages or arbitrarily extend
working hours.314 The obligation to supervise enforcement of the
law is repeated in the Charter,315 other statutes316 and legislative
instruments at both national317 and regional levels.318
312 See art. 17 of the 1992 version of the Trade Union Law.
313 Trade Union Law art. 22.
314 Trade Union Law arts. 22(1) and (3).
315 Trade Union Charter art. 28(6).
316 See e.g., Labor Law art. 88; Work Safety Law arts. 7, 52
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These provisions suggest that, while Chinese trade unions may
not be worker representative organizations as understood in liberal
democratic societies, they are nevertheless well positioned to
protect worker entitlements where these are set out in the law,
indeed they are directed to do so. Importantly, seeing that labor law
is properly implemented does not, on its face, put unions in tension
with the party-state. In fact, state policy actively promotes close
collaboration between labor inspectorates and trade unions on
enforcement issues, including through the nomination and training
by labor departments of labor compliance supervisors within
corresponding levels of the trade union structures.319
317 See e.g., Labor Inspection Regulations art. 7.
318 See e.g., Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra
note 146, arts. 45, 46.
319 See Guanyu Jiaqiang Laodong Baozhang Jiancha yu Gonghui Laodong
Baozhang Falü Jiandu Xianghu Peihu Gongzuo de Tongzhi [Notice
concerning Strengthening the Coordination of Labor Protection Inspection
and Trade Union Labor Protection Supervision], issued jointly by the
MOLSS and ACFTU, November 13, 2001, with immediate effect, cl 5.

129

In principle, official Chinese trade unions could be a much more
effective force for securing compliance than labor department
inspectors. According to official data, union officials outnumber
inspectors by more than seven to one320 and unlike labor
inspectors, officials of base-level unions are located within
enterprises and so can conduct ongoing monitoring. In particular,
base-level unions are ideally placed to prevent unreasonable
working hours.

Unfortunately, for many reasons, the compliance function of
Chinese unions remains weak.

First, the legal powers available to a union to compel an employer
to adhere to the law are inadequate. Where a union identifies a
violation of the law, it has no direct remedy against the employer.
Its power is essentially limited to raising the issue with the

320 Compare the statistics at, supra notes 207 and 297.
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employer and seeking its response.321 It has no substantive legal or
industrial weapon at its disposal and is dependent on other agencies
to apply sanctions – in most cases either the labor inspectorate322
or a LDAC.323 As we have already seen, these agencies have
problems of their own.

321 Art 22 of the Trade Union Law provides that on discovering a violation, the
union shall (1) negotiate with the enterprise on behalf of the employees and
(2) require the enterprise to adopt measures to correct the situation.
(‘…daibiao zhigong yu qiye, shiye danwei jiaoshe, yaoqiu qiye, shiye danwei
caiqu cuoshi yuyi gaizheng’): Trade Union Law art. 22. The employer is
obliged to respond but there is no specific penalty for failing to do so.
Compare, e.g. Labor Law art. 88: Work Safety Law art. 52; Guangdong
Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages art 45.
322 If an employer refuses to respond to a union request to comply with the law:
Trade Union Law art. 22.
323 Unions can invoke labor arbitration if the firm breaches a collective labor
contract: Trade Union Law art. 20. If a firm breaches an individual contract,
it is obliged to (yingdang) ‘support and give assistance to’ an individual who
takes a case to a LDAC or to court: art. 21.
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As for industrial sanctions, there is no right to strike in China,
even where there is a life-endangering hazard in the enterprise.324
Strikes are not expressly prohibited by labor legislation – although
they can easily fall foul of the many laws and regulations dealing
with public order. However, the Trade Union Law in effect casts a
duty on trade unions to prevent industrial action. Where industrial
action occurs in an enterprise, the union is required to ‘express the
employee’s views, negotiate with the employer and propose a
resolution’. It cannot lead a stoppage but, on the contrary, is
enjoined to help the enterprise ‘resume production as quickly as
possible’ and ‘restore work discipline’.325 This is consistent with
one of the other state-mandated functions of Chinese trade unions –

324 Trade Union Law art. 24. A union may only suggest to the employer that
work cease.
325 Id. art. 27. Union officials frequently seek actively to prevent or defuse
industrial action on the basis of the ‘national interest’: Feng Chen, Between
the State and Labor: The Conflict of Chinese Trade Unions' Double Identity
in Market Reform, 176 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 1006, 1018-1022 (2003).
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to date the most prominent one – to mobilize employees to
participate in economic construction.326

Second, many enterprise level unions are dominated by
management. Indeed, union officials may themselves be enterprise
managers.327 This is clearly in conflict with the ILO principles on
preventing interference with union autonomy328 as well as the

326 Trade Union Law art. 7.
327 Gallagher, supra note 36, at 26-28, 32-33. Clarke et al, supra note 284, at
241-244. They state that ‘it is the dependence of the trade union on
management, rather than its dependence on the Party, that is the main barrier
to the development of an industrial relations system in China: id. at 241.
328 Art 2 of the ILO’s Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention,
supra note 309, provides:
1. Workers' and employers' organizations shall enjoy adequate protection
against any acts of interference by each other or each other's agents or
members in their establishment, functioning or administration.
2. In particular, acts which are designed to promote the establishment of
workers' organizations under the domination of employers or employers'
organizations, or to support workers' organizations by financial or other
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position in most industrialized countries where legislation and/or
the internal rules of unions prevent management dominance of
unions. The key role managers play in many Chinese enterpriselevel unions is a legacy of an economy in which most enterprises
were socialized and

workplace relations

were based

on

administrative arrangements rather than contract. According to CCP
ideology, since firms were owned by the state and workers were the
‘masters of the state’, there could be no serious conflict of interest
between the aspirations of the workers and the management of
enterprises. Collective bargaining and strike action were foreign to
unions, and it was not unusual for union officials to hold senior
management positions. During this period, the primary roles of
unions were to participate in allocating enterprise-based social
welfare benefits, mediate labor-management disputes and maintain
production order.329

means, with the object of placing such organizations under the control of
employers or employers' organizations, shall be deemed to constitute acts of
interference within the meaning of this Article.
329 See e.g., TAYLOR ET AL, supra note 25, at 103-107.
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Of course, economic arrangements in the Chinese labor market
have been undergoing a process of radical change since the mid1980s. Many state and collec tively owned enterprises have been
privatized, private firms now employ a majority of the workforce
and workplace relations are now based on contract. In the private
sector, at least, there can be no pretence that the interests of firm
managers and workers are now entirely congruent. In such firms,
the involvement of senior managers in the trade unions is especially
inappropriate.330 In the context of enforcement of labor law, it is
obvious that a manager in a firm that has breached obligations to its
employees will be tempted to prevent a union taking action against
the firm or assisting a worker to take such an action. If the firm
manager is also the union secretary, then union support for
enforcement

proceedings

is

unlikely

to

be

forthcoming.

Observation confirms this: in many wage arrears cases, for

330 Taylor et al report from their fieldwork that in some localities, the ACFTU
has agreed to allow private firm managers to appoint the union chairperson
because of pressure applied by local government authorities: id. at 127.
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example, the union official has actively represented management in
arbitration proceedings.331

The 2001 revisions of the Trade Union Law make considerable
progress in protecting union members from retaliation by a firm.332
A firm which violates these protective provisions may face
fines,333 reinstatement and compensation orders334 and, in some
circumstances, criminal sanctions.335 Moreover, the Law states that
‘close relatives of those chiefly responsible for running a firm’
(qiye zhuyao fuzeren) cannot be candidates for election to union
331 Greenfield & Pringle, supra note 26, at 36; see also Ching Kwan Lee, From
Organized Dependence to Disorganized Despotism: Changing Labor
Relations in Chinese Factories, 157 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 44, 58 (1999).
332 See Trade Union Law arts. 50-54.
333 See Labor Inspection Regulations arts. 29-30 (fines stipulated are between
2,000 and 20,000 yuan).
334 Trade Union Law arts. 51 and 52.
335 Id. art. 50 (obstructing employees by means of violence or intimidation from
joining a trade union, or obstructing higher level trade unions assisting
employees to establish a trade union).
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committees at enterprise union level. It also provides for trade
union officials to be democratically elected or recalled.336
However, crucially, the Law does not prevent managers themselves
being elected.337

Third, there are limited means through which members can
compel their unions to protect their entitlements or to represent
them, as the law requires. The Trade Union Law obliges unions to
assist individual workers who commence proceedings in a LDAC
or in the courts.338 One of the important revisions to the Trade
Union Law made in 2001 was to confer an express right on trade
unions to litigate directly where an employer violates a collective

336 Id. arts. 9 and 17.
337 Any person for whom wages are a major source of income is entitled to
become a trade union members and to elect and be elected to office in a
union: id. art. 3; Trade Union Charter arts. 2 and 3(1). This would presumably
prevent an owner of a firm becoming a union member, but not a firm’s
executive officers.
338 Trade Union Law art. 21.
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contract.339 The relevant union can take the employer to a LDAC
and then to court.340

There are many disputes in which unions do in fact assist
workers.341 However, there are many other circumstances (apart
from straightforward management domination) in which the unions
decline to help, especially if facts are disputed or there is a large
collective dispute. As Feng Chen has pointed out, where it occurs,
the involvement of unions in compliance issues tends to be casebased rather than focusing on underlying structural issues which
lead to abuses becoming endemic.342

339 Trade Union Law art. 20. See also art. 49.
340 Id.
341 See e.g., those cited in Chen, supra note 325, at 1012-1017.
342 Id. at 1017. Chen writes that ‘representing workers in open protests creates
an image of organized action, which is politically risky and, indeed, the last
thing unions want to be part of. Organized action per se, no matter what the
reason for it, its basis and its targets, is taboo’: id. at 1016.
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Where unions refuse to help workers, they cannot be legally
required to exercise these powers. Although courts are beginning to
entertain nonfeasance complaints by union members, there has not
as yet been an unequivocal decision in which a union has been
directed by a court to perform its statutory function of representing
workers.343 At present, individual union members dissatisfied with
their representation must essentially direct their complaints to the
next level of the union hierarchy.344

Even where a union does seek to represent workers in litigation, it
encounters significant obstacles, as Professor Liu Cheng points
out.345 For example, it is not clear what procedural rules apply, and
union officials in the enterprise unions have a poor knowledge of
labor law.346
343 Kai Chang, Collective Bargaining: Problems and Solutions, 11(4)
INTERNATIONAL UNION RIGHTS 3 (2004).
344 Id.
345 CHENG, supra note 325.
346 Id.
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Fourth, where Chinese unions do attempt to assist workers, their
efforts have not been directed to those workers who suffer from the
most egregious violations of the law. Either unions are not present
in those enterprises where the worst violations occur or they
exclude from membership the worst affected workers. Despite the
apparently large number of union members and union officials, at
best only around 30% of private enterprises are unionized,347 and
even in the unionized firms, the union structures often exist only on
paper.348

347 CHANG, supra note 343, at 4; see also Daniel Ding et al., The Impact of
Economic Reform on the Role of Trade Unions in Chinese Enterprises, 13
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 431 (2002).
On the conduct of unions in various kinds of private sector firms see:
Gallagher, supra note 36, at 26-31.
348 On the top-down approach to organizing taken by the ACFTU, see Chen,
supra note 325, at 1025. On the ineffectiveness of unions in many private
firms, see Ding et al, supra note 347, at 445-46; Ding et al comment that, in
many of the private firms they surveyed, unions were operating more like ‘a
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Of still more consequence, the ACFTU did not until very recently
attempt to represent or act in the interests of migrant workers at all.
Migrant workers, being from rural areas, were classified as
agricultural workers (nongmingong) and therefore not part of the
‘working class’ participating in the union. Chinese unions have
focused on representing urban workers with long-term contracts
and we have seen that such workers generally enjoy much better
working conditions than migrant workers.349

The position has now changed, at least in a formal sense. In 2003,
the ACFTU issued a circular stipulating that all migrant workers

family and entertainment office of the HR department’ than as branches of a
nation-wide trade union organization: id.
349 Local surveys indicated that very few migrant workers participated in unions
prior to the 2003 policy change: Jiu Mingong Jiaru Gonghui, Laodong
Bumen Ying Ti Mingong Shuohua (Only 3.6% of Rural Workers Join
Unions; Labor Departments Should Speak Up For Them), March 14, 2003,
Nanfang Dushi Bao (reporting survey commissioned by the firms in
Shenzhen).
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are entitled to join trade unions, irrespective of their hukou status or
their work experience.350 Since then, the organization has issued
further notices, actively encouraging its constituent unions to
recruit migrant workers.351 According to some official reports,
these efforts have been astonishingly successful, with massive
increases in migrant worker membership.352 However, such claims
should be treated with skepticism until more detailed empirical
evidence confirms whether officials trade unions are now in fact
more effective in protecting the legal entitlements of migrant
workers.
350 Union Accepts Migrant Workers, CHINA DAILY, September 3, 2003.
351 E.g. Guanyu Zuzhi Gezhong Suoyouzhi, Shiye Danwei Ji Jiguan de
Laowugong Jiaru Gonghui de Tongzhi (Notice on Organizing Laborers to
Join Unions in Business Enterprises with All Kinds of Ownership Structures,
and Non-profit Enterprises Organs) issued on October 30, 2004.
352 Chinese press reports make the astonishing claim that in the month after this
notice was issued 34 million rural workers joined trade unions: Migrant
Workers Flock to Join China’s Trade Unions, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY
September

21,

2003:

<http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2003-

09/21/content_1091989.htm>.
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E T O WA R D S

A

M O R E C O MP R EH E N S IV E R ES P O N S E

U N D ER PAY M EN T

OF

TO

WA G ES ?

Chinese labor law’s internal defects seem to provide little hope
that it will steer workplaces away from abusive practices. However,
an overly pessimistic conclusion is not justified: there is a high
degree of dynamism in the process of legal reform in China. This
opens up sites for progressive intervention, so that certain useful
changes to the law may be feasible. Let me illustrate this by
discussing a recent important legal initiative, one showing that,
paradoxically, one of the apparent difficulties with the Chinese
system of labor regulation – its jurisdictional fragmentation – can
in fact lead to productive innovation.

Several provincial and municipal governments have been trying
to improve the regulatory framework dealing with underpayment of
wages. One of the most comprehensive efforts came into effect at
the beginning of 2005. The Guangdong Province Regulations on
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the Payment of Wages (the ‘Guangdong Wage Regulations’)353
brings together in one well-ordered document many of the
principles on wage determination and wage enforcement scattered
in various national and local legal materials. It also makes
significant innovations.

The Guangdong Wage Regulations clarify how wages are
defined,354 the form in which, and the person to whom, they must
be paid,355 and the relationship between wages and individual and
collective contracts.356 They stipulate how the minimum wage and
penalty rates are to be calculated, including in relation to piecework
and accumulated hours schemes.357 The Regulations set out the

353 See supra note 146.
354 Id. art. 54
355 Id. arts. 10-11.
356 Id. arts. 8 - 9.
357 Id. arts. 4, 8, 18, 10, 20, 21, 22. The provisions do not apply to irregular
hours schemes: art 23.
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entitlement to wages where work stoppages occur,358 where there
has been a wrongful termination359 and when a worker takes sick
leave, holiday leave and other forms of leave.360 They also ensure
that workers will receive remuneration when they are engaged in
representational activities361 (such as work for the union or
workers congresses, and participation in the negotiation of
collective contracts).362

358 Id. art. 35.
359 Id. arts. 13, 29.
360 Id. arts. 12, 19, 24, 25. They also stipulate when payment must be made.
361 Id. art. 26.
362 Some may find this overly prescriptive and consider that many of these
matters should be determined by individual arrangements. The prescription
is at least to some extent necessary because of (1) the absence of many
contract default rules; (2) the likelihood of disputes and abuses arising where
no clear legal rules exist.; and (3) the unsophisticated nature of much
workplace bargaining. On the latter point, see e.g., TAYLOR ET AL, supra note
25, at 192-195. It is also responding to the concrete experience of wage
conflicts over the last twenty years of labor market reforms. Note also that
employers can ‘opt-out’ of the rules pertaining to overtime and leave
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In relation to the vague terms in the Labor Law we examined
above (‘misappropriation’ and ‘payment in arrears without
justification’), the Guangdong Regulations indicate what types of
deductions are lawful and other types of deductions constituting
misappropriation.363 They do not use the expression ‘without
justification’; instead they detail how labor departments are to deal
with

degrees

of

employer

tardiness

and

obstruction.364

Unfortunately, though, they do not state categorically that the
payment of a bond on commencement of employment is unlawful.

While the systematic stipulation of key rules on remuneration is a
very significant advance on the fragmentary state of the law at the
payments where they engage staff that fall within in the categories enabling
irregular working hours schemes to be introduced: Guangdong Province
Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146, art. 23.
363 Id. arts. 10, 14, 15. These reflect the Temporary Regulations on the Payment
of Wages, supra note 99.
364 Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146,
Chapters 3 and 4.
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national level, the most important aspect of the Guangdong Wage
Regulations is their treatment of enforcement and compliance. In
addition to the measures we have already seen, the Guangdong
Wage Regulations include a number of provisions that strengthen
the enforcement process.

First, firms are required to implement their own compliance
systems. All firms must establish and make public to their
workforce a wages scheme which indicates how wages are
determined and varied, when they are to be paid, how overtime is
to be paid, and which deductions may lawfully be made.365
Individual workers are entitled to be informed of the content of the
scheme.366 Firms must also keep detailed records on wages for two
years. The records must indicate matters such as wages paid, how
the wages are related to time worked and any deductions made.367
Individual workers receive their own pay slips that must be
365 Id, art. 7.
366 Id.
367 Id. art. 16.
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consistent with the general firm records.368 In the event of any
dispute, the onus is on the employer to show that it has produced
these records; if the employer does not produce them, employees
may be deemed to be unpaid.369

Second, the Guangdong Wage Regulations broaden legal liability
for wages where formal legal structures have been shown to
prejudice employees, such as to individual partners of insolvent
partnerships,370 to head contractors in building projects,371 and to
successor firms following merger or division.372 This goes some
way towards addressing the failure in the Labor Law to deal with
‘boundary’ issues.373

368 Id. art. 17.
369 Id. arts. 17, 44
370 Id. art. 30
371 Id. art. 33
372 Id. art. 34.
373 See supra, Part III.A.5.
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Third, the Regulations set up a public warning system for firms
significantly in arrears.374 The labor department can notify the
public of the firm’s poor record through the media, at employment
agencies and by notices in the firm itself.

Fourth, a firm’s legal representative (such as the general manager
or head of the board of directors) can be personally fined for a
firm’s non-compliance with the regulations. This is the case, for
example, where a wages scheme is not established, records are not
kept375 or where industrial conflict breaks out and the manager
fails to attend on the spot within 24 hours.376 If the conflict arises
because a firm has attempted to relocate in order to avoid paying

374 Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146,
arts. 37, 41. Where firms are either two consecutive months in arrears or three
months in total, they are to be recorded within the labor department for
possible action. Firms with good compliance records are to be positively
evaluated and recorded.
375 Id. art. 48.
376 Id. art. 51.
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wages, the legal representative can be detained by the public
security bureau or arrested.377

The Guangdong Wage Regulations indicate that it is possible to
develop clear substantive norms regulating remuneration in a
systematic manner. They also deploy compliance strategies that are
far more sophisticated than those in the national law. The critical
question is of course how well this important initiative will operate
in practice. It is too early to know.

IV . PROSPECTS FOR BETTER IMPLEMENTATION

Despite progressive initiatives such as the Guangdong Wage
Regulations, the overall impression from this analysis is that there
are very serious flaws in the law relating to payment of wages and
working hours and the implementation of that law. Some of these
problems are specific to labor law (such as the labor disputes

377 Id.
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system and the peculiar legal status of Chinese trade unions) while
others concern the legal system as a whole (such as the disorderly
state of legal norms, local bureaucratic corruption and the
difficulties with enforcing court judgments).

One way in which researchers outside China might contribute to
improving the formulation of and compliance with the labor law is
to draw on our own societies’ experience of regulatory
implementation, to the extent that those experiences are relevant in
the Chinese context. I attempt to do that in this Part. I begin with a
discussion of the relative strengths of different regulatory
approaches in the Chinese context and then proceed from this to
offer a number of reform proposals.

A A LTE R N ATIV E R E G U L ATO RY A P P R O A C H E S

China’s approach to formal (or state-based) regulation in general,
and to labor regulation in particular, heavily favors ‘command and
control’. For several decades now, command and control
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approaches have been severely criticized in the regulatory literature
of industrialized societies.378 Command and control is premised on
the ability of a regulator to craft rules and enforcement mechanisms
which both address in a comprehensive manner the social problem
that prompted the regulatory intervention and foresee and avert the
potential adverse effects of the intervention itself. The complexity
of social relations and the scarce resources available to regulatory
agencies make this frequently unachievable. Consequently,
command and control regulation often tends towards excessive
bureaucratization and legalism, and resistance by the regulatory
target379 (although as I point out below, there are some
circumstances in which it may still be the preferable strategy).

378 See e.g., EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS (1982). Problems include
ever more complex rule-making, rigidity, strategies of evasion and creative
compliance on the part of the regulated, distortion of regulatory intent by
implementing agencies, high enforcement costs and enforcement failures.
379 See e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION:
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992).
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Furthermore, many studies demonstrate that the ‘command’ is
very often transformed when it is placed in the hands of officers in
regulatory agencies. The agencies’ interpretation of the legal rules
they enforce is refracted through their own systems of values and
practices, which affect matters such as the priority accorded to
remedying different kinds of violations, and the nature of the
sanction deployed. It follows that the practical implementation of
legal rules by regulatory agencies can depart far from what the
original drafters of the legal rules intended.380

In response to these adverse effects, many scholars, including in
the field of labor law, have described a range of complementary
and alternative regulatory approaches. These approaches have
frequently proved themselves superior to ‘command and control’ in

380 See e.g., KEITH HAWKINS, ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT (1987). John
Paterson & Gunther Teubner, Changing Maps: Empirical Legal Autopoiesis,
7 SOC. & LEGAL STUDIES 455 (1998).
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practice.381 They have involved efforts to make law more
‘responsive’382 or ‘reflexive’,383 enlisting the co-operation of those
subject to it through establishing connections with their own frames

381 See e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 379; Michael Dorf & Charles
Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
267 (1998); Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern
Law, 17 LAW AND SOC. REV. 239 (1983); Gunther Teubner, Juridification:
Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in Juridification of Social Spheres: A
Comparative Analysis in the Areas of Labor, Corporate, Antitrust, and Social
Welfare Law (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987) ; David Hess, Social Reporting: A
Reflexive Law Approach to Corporate Social Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L.
41 (1999); CHRISTINE PARKER, THE OPEN CORPORATION: EFFECTIVE SELFREGULATION AND

DEMOCRACY (2002). In the area of labor law, see: Orly

Lobel, Orchestrated Experimentalism in the Regulation of Work 101
MICHIGAN L. REV.2146 (2003); Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of
the Workplace in an Era of Self-regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005).
382 See e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 379.
383 See e.g., Teubner (1983), supra note 381; ROGOWSKI, supra note 20.
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of reference,384 and/or radically reconfiguring legal institutions on
democratic experimentalist lines.385 One common theme in these
approaches is the coordinated ‘decentring’386 of responsibility for
both the creation of regulatory norms and their implementation to
multiple actors (including especially local non-state actors), albeit
usually with oversight from and accountability to governmental
institutions (‘metaregulation’). In some instances, the literature
attempts to integrate ‘corporate social responsibility’ initiatives into
regulatory frameworks, although these initiatives have also elicited
considerable skepticism.387
384 See generally, HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 62-9 (1999)
(noting that private law of contracts fits closely with a model of responsive
regulation).
385 See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 381.
386 Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the Role of Regulation
and Self-regulation in a Post-regulating World, 54 CURRENT LEGAL
PROBLEMS 103 (2001) at 106-111. For a related analysis in the field of labor
law, see Mark Barenberg, Labor Federalism in the United States: Lessons for
International Labor Rights, 2001 J. INT’L ECON. L. 303.
387 Cooney, supra note 177, at 308-314.
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A second theme is the encouragement of local democratic
deliberation – the participation of those most affected by the social
problem that calls for a regulatory response. A third theme is an
emphasis on local experimentation in the development of responses
to social problems, which, when monitored and evaluated, yields a
dynamic learning process that generates ongoing improvements in
regulatory norms and mechanisms.

B T H E F E A S IB I LI TY

OF

A LTE R N ATIV E R E G U L ATO RY

A P P R O A C H ES

IN

C H IN A

While alternative regulatory approaches offer a way to escape the
pitfalls of command and control, it is doubtful how far they can be
applied in the Chinese context. After considering whether
regulatory alternatives to command and control (and in particular
democratic experimentalism) can be implemented in China, Randy
Peerenboom concludes that:
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both greater reliance on private actors and more bottom-up
experimentalism rely on the infrastructure of a modern
state, including a legal system that meets basic rule-of-law
requirements, democratic elections and an active civil
society. But that infrastructure is not yet in place in
China.388

He cites many serious obstacles to alternative regulatory
approaches in China. The list is formidable: the adherence to
democratic centralism; the absence of strong, autonomous, civil
society organizations and the lack of independent vehicles for
diffusing and critiquing information; low education and literacy
levels; the likely hostility of the bureaucracy to alternative
approaches; the likely resistance of local governmental institutions
to requirements of information disclosure and external monitoring
and evaluation (vital to the effectiveness of those approaches); the
prevalence of corruption among both state and private actors;

388 PEERENBOOM, supra note 51, at 431.
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widespread intolerance of diverse viewpoints, inhibiting reasoned
deliberation; and weak judicial institutions.389

While Peerenboom is writing in general terms about the Chinese
regulatory environment, analysis in this article confirms that the
obstacles he identifies are present in an acute form in the field of
work relations. This suggests that reflexive strategies for regulating
labor relations in Chinese firms will be difficult to implement. Take
for example mandated social reporting.390 This relies on the
generation and distribution of accurate information, but agencies
and employers frequently falsify information and obstruct
monitoring and evaluation. Even where sophisticated systems of
corporate responsibility codes and social audits have been
implemented by foreign multinationals operating in China, they
have often floundered in the workplaces operated by their Chinese,

389 Id. at 428-431.
390 See e.g., Hess, supra note 381; Cooney, supra note 177, at 334-337.
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Taiwanese and Korean subcontractors.391 If major multinational
corporations, motivated by strong consumer pressure and able to
devote considerable resources to supplier monitoring, encounter
great difficulties in securing compliance with labor standards, it is
very unlikely that Chinese legislation requiring firms to disclose
their social performance will be effective.

Even more significantly, the civil society organizations most
relevant to more participatory forms of workplace regulation –
organizations of working people – are either subordinate to the
party-state, top-driven and frequently aligned with management, or
actively suppressed. Moreover, as we have seen, the lawful worker
organizations have, at least until very recently, done very little to
give voice to migrant workers – the socially and economically
marginalized people whom Chinese labor law is most deficient in

391 This is most clearly demonstrated in the extensive empirical work of LIU &
TAN, supra note 34. See also NIKE, FY04 CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY
REPORT (Nike, 2005) Part II Section 4, which indicates a number of
compliance problems in China.
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assisting. Migrant workers’ low educational levels and social status
often leave them unwilling and unable to articulate their concerns;
unless they receive institutional support, they will not be able to
contribute to local regulatory processes.

Overall, circumstances are not very promising for new
approaches displacing the current command and control mode of
regulation. Norm-setting and enforcement will continue to be
focused on state agencies.392

That said, there is still some scope for regulatory experimentation
and decentralization. This scope is fairly wide within the state
apparatus. In the post-1978 period, China has frequently taken an
incremental, localized and experimental approach to economic and
social reform.393 This approach has extended to labor regulation:
there have been rolling improvements in legal norms and

392 PEERENBOOM comes to a similar conclusion for the legal system as a whole,
supra note 51, at 431.
393 Id. at 427-428.
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enforcement strategies, as the Guangdong Wage Regulations
(themselves the product of experimentation at the local municipal
level)394 illustrate. To be sure, these initiatives do not devolve
regulatory power away from state entities (although they shift it
from the central government). They do not involve affected citizens
in collaborative problem-solving (other than through ‘their’ quasistate organization, the ACFTU). They mainly consist of a series of
commands coupled with punishments (although they try to prompt
firms to build internal compliance systems). Their profusion also
makes the Chinese legal landscape unstable and complex.

Despite all this, Chinese norm-making practice is a relatively
nimble form of coordinated decentralization (especially when
compared to law-making in major federal systems). It has enabled
the ongoing revision of labor norms and processes and the
simultaneous trialing of a diverse range of regulatory innovations.

394 John Chen, Wage Arrears Fuel Discontent, CHINA LAW BULLETIN, August
31, 2002.
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It has given law some prospect of responding to the accelerating
changes in, and the diversification of, Chinese work relations.

Moreover, even non-state initiatives experience some success.
Many Chinese workplaces are affected by decentred forms of
regulation, particular those associated with ‘corporate social
responsibility’ initiatives in global supply chains. I have noted that
many of these are plagued by disingenuous compliance and false
information flows. But, as I discuss further below, not all of these
initiatives fail.

In sum, labor reform proposals need to recognize that the basic
‘command and control’ orientation of labor regulation will persist
in China. Within that orientation, there is some scope for
experimenting and for integrating insights from alternative
regulatory approaches in order to construct more sophisticated
labor

enforcement

strategies.

But

wholesale

adoption

of

decentralized, participative, approaches is not viable while
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corruption is endemic and worker organizations are subverted by
democratic centralism and management interference.

C S O M E S U G G E S TIO N S

The following suggestions aim to improve compliance with labor
law, particularly the entitlement of workers to be paid for their
service and to work reasonable hours. They assume that there is no
impending radical change to China’s regulatory practices. They
seek to recognize and respond to the limitations of those practices,
and to the wider political, economic and social contexts of Chinese
work relations.
1 Clarification of Key Norms
Basic labor laws norms need to be clarified through the
enactment of further legislation on labor contracts and wages, and a
review of the provisions on working hours, especially the ‘opt-out’
procedures. We can be optimistic in relation to wage issues. As we
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have seen, the legislative amendment process is already well
advanced at the provincial level.395

On working hours, the position is more difficult. In many
industrialized countries, there has been a shift away from setting
absolute substantive standards on working hours to more
procedural approaches, with direct employee involvement. For
example, in the European Union, employees have a right to refuse
to work more than 48 hours a week on average.396

In contrast to these approaches, which seek (imperfectly)397 to
give effect to employee preferences, China mandates working

395 See supra Part III.E.
396 Council Directive concerning Certain Aspects of Working Time 93/104/EC,
23rd November 1993. See generally the discussions in WORKING TIME AND
WORKERS' PREFERENCES IN INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (Jon Messenger ed.,
2004); JILL MURRAY, TRANSNATIONAL LABOR REGULATION: THE ILO AND
EC COMPARED (2001).
397 See e.g., Murray, supra note 396.
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hours for firms, regardless of employee wishes, but gives wide
discretion to labor bureau to enable employersto derogate from the
mandated scheme. China may therefore need to revise the
conceptual foundations of its approach at some point. Nonetheless,
it seems to me preferable to remain with core aspects of the (ILOinspired) substantive approach at present, at least with respect to
unskilled and semi-skilled workers. Those workers do not have true
representative organizations through which to inform themselves
and express their preferences about working hours. Their low
education and frequently tenuous residency status, together with
remuneration difficulties arising from the arrears problems, suggest
that the specification of a standard is still necessary. That standard
should continue to be set at the points in excess of which prolonged
periods of work give rise to serious health consequences, namely
around the fifty hours per week mark and six consecutive working
days.398 It is obviously also necessary to specify more carefully the
circumstances in which employers can opt out of the norms.399
398 See supra, Part III.A.4.
399 As the Beijing Working Hours Regulations do, supra note 130.
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A further problem for the current hours regime is, however, that
in some sectors of manufacturing industry, economic pressures on
firms are so severe that there seems little immediate prospect of
bringing hours into conformity with the law. Should then, a more
realistic standard be specified? Rather than rewriting the law,
eroding the standards, and altering existing entitlements (the law
being reflected in individual and collective contracts), it would be
better to factor the practicalities of compliance into a gradated
enforcement strategy (as discussed in the following section). Those
firms with working hours that are most injurious to health should
be targeted by enforcement agencies and unions in a co-coordinated
way.

Another challenging task for legal norm-creation is the need to
address new forms of working relationships that cannot easily be
accommodated within the labor contract/contract for services
divide. The ideological insistence that a labor contract is radically
different from other forms of contracting, although admirable in
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seeking to avoid the commodification of labor, does not assist in
practice. Decentralized legislative experiments are needed to
develop ways of assisting dependent workers who do not fall
clearly within the present definition of employee or where the
identity of the employer is uncertain. Such experiments will also
allow for greater responsiveness to local conditions (and industry
structure).400 The provisions in the Guangdong Wage Regulations
dealing with construction sites are an example of how innovation
may be achieved.401

2 More Effective Sanctions
A number of fairly obvious changes to the institutions responsible
for implementing the laws are needed. One line of reforms would
be to increase the enforcement powers of the labor bureaucracy and
400 Of course, such experiments ought to involve participation from the people
most affected by the regulation, but this is clearly not going to be feasible
under present conditions.
401 Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages, supra note 146,
arts 33 and 34.
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the quasi-state agency that is the ACFTU. I noted above that these
are quite weak and fail to outweigh economic incentives to flout
the law. The suggestion is bound to be controversial. It is a classic
‘command and control’ response to a regulatory problem, and
perpetuates the pathologies associated with the bureaucratic
mentality. Worse, increasing sanctions available to Chinese state
agencies, notorious for abuse of discretionary power (not least
against labor activists), may be viewed by many as retrograde.

Nonetheless, at least in the context of the two abuses we have
been examining, bolstering enforcement powers is defensible and
indeed desirable. As many regulatory scholars acknowledge,
despite the undoubted deficiencies of command and control
approaches, there are circumstances in which the specification of a
clear

standard

accompanied

by

an

effective

penalty

is

appropriate.402 This may be so where a regulated firm is
persistently recalcitrant and failing to correct its deficiencies where

402 See e.g., NEIL GUNNINGHAM & PETER GRABOSKY, SMART REGULATION:
DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 41-42 (1st ed, 1998).
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it is clearly feasible for it do so. The case for a heavy-handed
approach strengthens where a firm’s actions cause considerable
suffering, as in occupational health and safety breaches.403 The
persistent and willful failure to pay due wages, and the imposition
of health-threatening working hours, fall into this cate gory.

At present, the strongest weapon in the labor department’s armory
is the fine, and fines are often difficult to collect. These are not
sufficient to make up for arrears or to curb excessive labor hours.
True, labor departments can refer matters to other state agencies for
tougher penalties, but those other state agencies will often not be
familiar with the principles governing labor relations. One way to
increase the powers of the unions and the labor bureaucracy would
be to enable them to order the suspension of production or business
for a specific period, until the law is complied with. As we have
seen, this is a penalty wielded by other administrative agencies.404

403 NEIL GUNNINGHAM & RICHARD JOHNSTONE, REGULATING WORKPLACE
SAFETY: SYSTEMS AND SANCTIONS 183-291 (1999).
404 See Administrative Punishments Law, supra note 167 art. 8(4).
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This power could be exercised in the more egregious circumstances
of unpaid wages and excessive working hours, where command
and control strategies are likely to be more effective.

A rule might specify that a labor department may order cessation
of production in order to bring an enterprise into compliance with
the law where staff have been working for more than eleven
consecutive hours405 or six consecutive days.406 Similarly, a rule
might specify that where staff had not been paid for more than two
months, production would cease for a certain period.

A closure power would give inspectors much greater clout.
Admittedly, conferral of increased powers poses the risk of
arbitrary abuses and adverse consequences often associated with
command and control measures. However, we have seen that

405 The maximum time that hours can be extended in any one day under the
Labor Law; see supra note 116.
406 Labor Law art. 38.
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administrative reforms leave employers well placed – perhaps too
well placed – to challenge inappropriate administrative action.407

In any case, the best protection against abuse of increased powers
– and the most effective way to deploy them – is for labor
departments, led by the MOLSS, to integrate them into a
comprehensive and systematic enforcement strategy. Ayres and
Braithwaite’s concept of the ‘enforcement pyramid’ is relevant
here.408 Low-cost enforcement strategies such as persuasion and
warning are more easily deployed against non-compliant firms in
the first instance, but where they are met with defiance; the
enforcement agency can threaten sanctions of increasing severity.
Firms, knowing that regulatory agencies can ultimately impose
very severe punishments, may take their advice and warning more
seriously. As Ayres and Braithwaite write:

407 Supra notes 194-198 and accompanying text.
408 AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 379, at 35-38.
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Regulatory agencies have maximum capacity to lever cooperation
when they can escalate deterrence in a way that is responsive to
the degree of uncooperativeness of the firm, and to the moral and
political acceptability of the response.409

Labor departments cannot at present escalate up the enforcement
pyramid to closing a firm’s operations. This undermines the
effective use of even those weak sanctions they already have.410

3 Improving Dispute Resolution
Labor dispute resolution institutions also need major revision,
along the lines proposed by Professor Zheng411 and many other
409 Id. at 36.
410 Chinese state agencies might also consider financial incentives for good
performance. Such measures, though, depend on the accuracy of information
about firms, so it is dubious how far they can be implemented credibly in the
Chinese context.

OGUS, supra note 150, at 246-254; GUNNINGHAM &

GRABOSKI, supra note 402, at 69-83.
411 ZHENG, supra note 210, at 179-222.
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Chinese scholars.412 First, the requirement that arbitration always
precede litigation should be abolished, especially when a worker
simply wishes to recover outstanding wages. Second, LDACs
would benefit from a greater institutional independence from the
labor bureau and from better-trained personnel.

Third, more specific procedures for different kinds of labor
dispute (rights/interest; collective/individual) seem appropriate, and
greater powers to assist workers left without income as a result of
lengthy dispute resolution proceedings. Such procedures should
also, as Professor Liu argues, clarify how unions can exercise their
representational rights in arbitration and court proceedings.413
They should also enable LDACs to grant interim relief.

412 The support for these ideas was evident from the participants (leading
Chinese labor law scholars and labor officials) in the International Seminar
on Labor Dispute Resolution, held at Peking University Law School, 19-21
November 2004. I was able to take part in the seminar.
413 LIU, supra note 298.
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Fourth, the scope of ‘labor dispute’ should be broadly interpreted
to cover sub-contracting arrangements that involve dependent labor
(who may not technically be employees). One possibility would be
to enable LDACS to entertain disputes between independent
contractors in certain circumstances, as occurs with ‘unfair
contract’ legislation in several international jurisdictions.

4 Trade Union Reform
If China observed ILO conventions on the right to organize and to
bargain collectively, compliance with labor law would almost
certainly improve. Under present political circumstances, however,
it is unrealistic to think that China is prepared to do this. However,
if Chinese unions cannot lawfully become fully autonomous
worker organizations, they can at least become more effective
compliance agencies. There are several ways in which this could
occur.

First, unions should have a power to direct workers to cease
production analogous to that proposed above for labor department
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inspectors. This would in effect confer a power on unions to call a
strike, albeit one that, formulated by reference to administrative
enforcement mechanisms, is linked to the enforcement of state law
and does not constitute a challenge to government policy on public
unrest. In any event, such strikes over existing entitlements occur
on an informal basis very frequently and at present appear to be
tolerated. This would provide a means of both legitimizing and
regulating them.

A further, crucial, move would be to render Chinese trade unions
more independent from firm management, especially in the private
sector. Ideally, the Trade Union Law would be amended to require
this. However, further amendment of the recently revised Law
would most likely be a cumbersome and contentious process.
Internal measures within the ACFTU, such as directives from
higher-level union bodies to grassroots unions located in firms may
be just as effective if done systematically. Democratic centralism,
while generally an obstacle to trade union autonomy, does have its
potential benefits. Higher-level unions, could, for example,
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systematically refuse to affirm (pizhun) the election of firm
managers to trade union offices at grass root level.

Such a move might arouse the ire of local governments in areas
where they have particularly corrupt links with business.414 Strong
central government support for greater union autonomy from firm
managers would be required to successfully implement it. Union
independence from management could also be encouraged by
judicial recognition of the right of union members to take
nonfeasance actions against their union officials where they have
been unreasonably refused assistance.

Even if these measures were adopted, they will not assist the most
vulnerable workers unless the ACFTU is able to mobilize its
enterprise unions to take up the issues of migrant workers. We have
seen that there is no longer a structural obstacle to this within the
organization.415 Moreover, at a rhetorical level, the ACFTU
414 See supra note 199.
415 See supra note 350.
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appears committed to renouncing its previous exclusionary
practices. Yet it will take a considerable change in the mentality of
local union cadres (overwhelmingly drawn from among the more
privileged urban employees with their prejudices against migrant
workers) to give practical effect to this.

The shortcomings of the ACFTU are so great as to suggest that
substantial improvements to its compliance function, such as those
proposed here, cannot be achieved. This is not necessarily so. There
are certainly many within the organization attempting to make it
more representative of worker interests and in some regions such as
Shanghai, Shandong

and Jiangsu, the municipal/provincial

federations seem to be relatively effective.416 Furthermore, the
Vietnam General Confederation of Labor (VGCL), the ACFTU’s
socialist counterpart across the southern border, has been much
more aggressive in forcing private firms to comply with labor

416 TAYLOR ET AL, supra note 25, at 129.
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standards.417 The ACFTU could take a lead from its more active
elements and from the VGCL and provide genuine assistance to
workers in private firms. If, on the other hand, the organization
fails to confront the reality of oppressive management treatment of
workers in many private firms and persists with its ‘mediating’
approach to dispute resolution, it will be, at best, irrelevant to those
workers.

5 Coordination between State and Private Sector Initiatives
In addition to improving individual state-based compliance
mechanisms, there needs to be greater coordination between those
mechanisms

and

private

sector

initiatives

(self-regulatory

measures). While Chinese civil society is tightly controlled, and
firms resistant to notions of corporate social responsibility, there
are nevertheless many significant private sector attempts to
improve labor conditions, including ensuring that workers are paid
417 Anita Chan & Hong-zen Wang, The Impact of the State on Workers'
Conditions-Comparing Taiwanese Factories in China and Vietnam, 77(4)
PACIFIC AFFAIRS 629 (2004-05).
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for work performed and do not work unreasonable hours.418 One
major source of these private sector initiatives is multinational
corporations whose supply chains are anchored in China. Under
often intense consumer pressure, many multinational corporations
have attempted to require their subcontractors to improve working
conditions.419 Many of these private sector initiatives fail in the
face of perfunctory and disingenuous participation by subcontractors, lack of participation by the affected workers and an
unwillingness and/or inability of multinational corporations to
establish

effective

monitoring

and

compliance

systems.420

418 See HILARY MURDOCH & DANIEL GOULD, CORPORATE SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN CHINA: MAPPING THE ENVIRONMENT, GLOBAL ALLIANCE
FOR WORKERS AND COMMUNITIES

63-71 (2004).

419 In any case, major international firms must take more responsibility for the
pressure they place on their suppliers to cut costs. They must themselves bear
some of the financial burden of improving working conditions: see LIU &
TAN, supra note 34, at 81-82.
420 For example, Liu and Tan write of a company with over 6,000 employees
which has adopted a code of conduct limiting working hours, as required by
its major client, an international footwear company, and has stationed a
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Nonetheless, multinational firms are continually reworking their
initiatives in the face of criticism, and have occasionally come up
with credible and creative compliance strategies, especially where
they collaborate with multi-stakeholder groups such as the Ethical
Trade Initiative or SA8000.421

It is not only multinational firms that are devising methods of
raising compliance with labor law. There are an increasing number
of actors outside the labor bureaucracy and the ACFTU that are
attempting to improve Chinese working conditions.422 These
include groups with links to non-government organizations
(particularly in Hong Kong),423 free-standing research and training
permanent auditor. However, the workers informed investigators outside the
factory that they nevertheless worked twelve to fourteen hour days, id. at 75.
421 See MURDOCH & GOULD, supra note 418, at 72-76.
422 See the catalogue of groups in MURDOCH & GOULD, supra note 418, at 3561.
423 See, e.g., the Chinese Working Women Network: see Ngai Pun & Wai Ling
Chan, Community Based Labor Organizing, 11(4) INTERNATIONAL UNION
RIGHTS 10 (2004); see <http://www.cwwn.org>.
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institutes,424

advisory

services

associated

with

Chinese

universities,425 some parts of the All China Women’s Federation426
and some individual Chinese firms.427 Even the Chinese
government, at both the national and provincial levels, is now
promoting ‘corporate social responsibility’.428

The range of initiatives in labor regulation occurring in both the
state and non-state spheres could be more productive if there were
better channels for coordinating and evaluating them. If each
measure is pursued in isolation, there is the potential for wasted

424 See e.g., the Institute for Contemporary Observation: <http://www.icochina.org/>;

and

the

Asia

Monitor

Resource

Centre:

<http://www.amrc.org.hk/>. See also 1 (10) CSR ASIA WEEKLY (2005).
425 See e.g., the legal clinics operated by the Law School at Sun Yat-sen
University in Guangzhou and at East China Normal University in Shanghai.
426 See <http://www.women.org.cn>.
427 CSR in China’s Supply Chains, 1 (15) CSR ASIA WEEKLY (2005).
428 China’s NPC, CSR and Social Harmony, 1 (12) CSR ASIA WEEKLY, Vol
(2005).
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resources through the simultaneous and independent adoption of
overlapping and even inconsistent strategies. To be sure, some
private sector initiatives are implemented in consultation with state
agencies and official trade unions. But this is too ad hoc and firm
specific. For systematic evaluation of measures to occur, coordination must occur across a range of firms within an industry or
geographic area. Moreover, when a measure is successful, there
needs to be a way of diffusing it: that is, enabling knowledge of it to
become widespread.

Is there space to establish institutions that could coordinate and
evaluate new labor initiatives in China? Aside from the serious
obstacles to implementing alternative regulatory approaches
already mentioned, there are further problems with coordinating
institutions. If an institution is concerned solely with private
initiatives, then it will fail to coordinate with state and quasi-state
regulatory measures and may even provoke bureaucratic hostility
and obstruction. On the other hand, if the institution examines both
private and state measures, it will need to involve state actors and
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would therefore risk either being dominated by the state
bureaucracy with its command and control mentality (at the
national level) or being captured by corrupt state-business networks
(at the local level). Nonetheless, I will sketch out how such
institutions might work.

A locality in China (preferably one with a relatively efficient and
progressive government and a relatively capable trade union
organization) could support the establishment of a multi-party
agency, or committee, which would collect, evaluate and diffuse
information from various sources about methods used to improve
compliance with labor law. Instead of simply working to coordinate
the efforts of labor departments and official trade unions, which
already occurs,429 the committee would include representatives
from firms and from non-state actors. The agency could seek the
cooperation of these actors on pilot studies.

429 See supra, note 319.
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For example, a pilot study could be conducted on ways to reduce
excessive working hours or reducing the problem of arrears.430 The
pilot studies could focus on particular industries (such as textiles
and clothing) or on particular kinds of firms (such as small and
medium-sized domestic enterprises). It would seek to develop both
an accurate picture of enforcement patterns in the locality and to
assess which enforcement strategies were effective. Those
strategies could include the command and control methods of the
labor bureaucracy, the ‘supervision’ of trade unions, self-regulation
by firms and initiatives from social actors.

Each of the constituents could contribute to the pilot study by
drawing on its particular regulatory strengths.431 Local labor
430 The Guangdong Province Regulations on the Payment of Wages currently
provide for firms to be evaluated in relation to their payment systems, with
some firms recorded (literally) in the ‘good books’ and others punished
through publication in the media: supra note 146, art. 41. However, this
evaluation is to be conducted by labor bureau alone.
431 The agency would not have enforcement powers as such since these are
already wielded by the labor departments.
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bureaus could map out their compliance strategies and use their
investigation powers under the Labor Law and other legislation to
gain data about firm enforcement,432 imposing sanctions for nondisclosure.433 Trade unions could invoke their own inspection and
monitoring powers under the law. Local and, even more
importantly, international, firms could indicate what new measures
they had made to improve compliance. The social organizations
could provide information (which may well be the most reliable
data) to cross-check the other sources.

The co-coordinating committee would determine what initiatives
were promising and successful. It could then:
•

publicize the initiatives widely, including to other firms, to

social organizations and to labor bureaus;
•

use the initiatives to determine what is ‘best practice’ in the

industry, advise firms to comply with best practice; and help the
labor bureaus, unions and other social organizations to insist that
432 For example, Labor Law arts. 85-87.
433 Id. art. 101.
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firms adopt it;
•

suggest to the labor bureaus that those firms which had

developed successful initiatives be financially rewarded; and
•

assist the labor bureaus to identify, criticize and (in cases of

refusal to improve) punish poor performers.

This process would be dynamic. Evaluation of best practice
would change from year to year (or according to another time
frame) as firms develop new and better ways of improving
conditions.

This proposal entails, in some industries at least, an
acknowledgement that very many firms do not comply with the
law. However, if firms are, in good faith, pursuing measures to
improve their working conditions, the fact that they are at present
in violation of the law need not attract a punitive response from
labor departments unless they are engaging in practices involving
imminent danger to workers or other severe illegality. If firms knew
that they would be punished for less serious breaches, despite
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taking serious steps to improve, they would have a powerful
disincentive against disclosing the real situation in an enterprise.

Fortunately, the structure of labor law enforcement provisions is
commonly to empower labor departments to give warnings or issue
correction orders (zeling gaizheng) prior to imposing a fine.

I emphasize that this proposal is quite speculative. It is quite
likely that the circumstances in China will severely limit the
capacity of such a scheme to produce demonstrable and widespread
changes in workplaces.434 It is admittedly very difficult to see the
scheme flourishing in the face of the authoritarian political
environment, bureaucratic institutional mindsets and the propensity
of firms to evade, deceive and subvert regulatory agencies of
whatever design. Nonetheless, as such a scheme has the potential to
achieve practical improvements in addressing the arrears and
excessive hours issue, it is worth keeping the idea in the public
arena.
434 See supra, note 416.
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6 More General Legal Reforms
The reforms proposed to date have all been specific to
‘protective’ labor law. Obviously, the prospects for success of those
proposals are closely tied to wider reforms to legal institutions.
Other writers have extensively canvassed such reforms and I will
not examine them in depth here. The main areas where ongoing
improvements are needed will be obvious to anyone reading this
article. They include matters such as (in relation to broader labor
law) further dismantling of the hukou system and (in relation to the
legal system more generally) more effective anticorruption
measures focusing on local government-business networks, better
means of enforcing legal judgments and better judicial training to
name but a few.435

435 See e.g., PEERENBOOM, supra note 51; Chen, supra note 51; Chan & Zhang,
supra note 46; LUBMAN, supra note 51.
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7 Campaigns and the media

While legal reforms may lead to better enforcement, there are of
course non-legal means of addressing labor abuses.436 The Chinese
state has often resorted to campaigns to target social problems such
as criminal activity437 and environmental pollution. The campaigns
involve the mobilization of party members and the coordinated
concentration of state agency resources on the social problem. At
times the campaigns have included resort to extra-legal measures,
although more recently state action is likely to be in accordance
with law.

A strong campaign against labor abuses initiated by government
may induce labor departments, police and other relevant agencies
to deal more firmly with recalcitrant firms. A major advantage of a
campaign is that it leads departments to co-ordinate. Thus, while as
we have seen, labor departments do not have effective enforcement
436

This is a major topic in its own right but can be dealt with only briefly here.

437

Bidduplh, supra note 52 at 62-86 on the ‘hard strike’ anti-crime campaigns;
Van Rooij, supra note 202 at 169-177 on environmental pollution.
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powers on their own, the capacity to sanction is strengthened if
they can credibly threaten police action in egregious cases. There is
evidence that such co-ordination is beginning to occur. In early
2006, in what seems to have been a municipal government
campaign, eight firm owners in Shenzhen were detained for
economic crimes in connection with failure to pay wages – the first
time such action has been taken in China.438

However, campaigns have a significant drawback – they are
ephemeral. Once a campaign ceases, attention and resources may
be directed to other issues. The problem may reemerge, unless there
are institutional reforms which complement the campaign.439

Another powerful means of addressing labor abuses is the media.
The Chinese media regularly highlights labor abuses440 whether as

438

Stephen Frost, China View Vol 2(3) 8-9 CSR ASIA WEEKLY (2005).

439

Van Rooij, supra note 202 at 172-174.

440

Chan, supra note 2 at 4-7. The accounts in Chan’s study are based on media
reports of incidents which Chan has often further investigated
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part of a campaign or as a result of the work of individual
journalists. Media exposure of injustice can lead to swift
governmental intervention redressing the wrong. Benjamin
Liebman notes that many Chinese believe the media is more
effective than the legal system for citizen redress.441 Nonetheless, as
with campaigns, the media is not a substitute for legal reform. As
Liebman also points out, the media is an unreliable ally and can
create injustices through misrepresentation and sensationalism.442
Moreover, while the media can be extremely useful in bringing
worker abuses to the public’s attention, it is not well placed to
address systematically the deficiencies which produce them

V. CONCLUSION
Out of the wreck of the Cultural Revolution, China’s leaders have
built an economy that is gaining an ever greater share of world

441

Benjamin Liebman, Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese
Legal System, 105 Colum. L.J. 1, 127-130 (2005), 7.

442

Id.
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manufacturing. They have thereby raised the living standards of
hundreds of millions of citizens. Notoriously, this manufacturing
success is marred by widespread labour abuses, epitomized by the
sweatshop

staffed

by

suffering

migrant

women

workers.

Domestically, rising labour disputes and evidence of emerging
labour shortages stoke demands for policy reform.

Better regulatory strategies are needed to deal with widespread
labour abuses. If we confine ourselves to what is feasible rather
than what is ideal – accepting that radical change to China’s legal
and political institutions is unlikely in the short term – then those
strategies must be devised having regard to the existing
institutional context. This entails a specific analysis of where those
institutions are deficient and where there are openings for
improvement.

The analysis undertaken here has focused on underpayment of
wages and excessive working hours. The legal norms directed at
preventing these abuses needs to be more coherently elaborated and
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public accessible, although there are already considerable
improvements being made at the provincial level.

Much more challenging is the problem of securing compliance. A
fundamental difficulty here is that the key state enforcement
institutions – labor departments, dispute resolution bodies and the
official trade union – continue to employ bureaucratic methods
increasingly anachronistic in China’s private-sector driven labor
markets. They operate with little active participation from the
persons most affected by labor abuses and with little connection to
emerging private sector initiatives directed at creating better
workplaces. Current thinking in regulatory theory suggests that this
approach is misconceived but the scope for introducing alternative
regulatory models remains limited.

Despite the limited room to maneuver, many improvements to
enforcement institutions can be implemented under current
conditions. I have sought to identify several; these are mainly
extrapolations of processes already underway or based on internal

193

critiques from Chinese scholars and officials. In the face of a
society governed by an illiberal regime, plagued by pervasive
corruption and dysfunctional legal institutions and segregated by
internal migration controls, the proposals may seem modest and
peripheral. I do not pretend to suggest that they will radically alter
working relations. Given the complexity of the social systems
impacting on the workplace and the relative absence of empirical
data on how law interrelates with those systems, the impact of the
reform proposals cannot be predicted; they must be provisional and
revisable. They are nonetheless worth implementing as a response
to present flaws.

Finally, the development of feasible proposals to reduce labor
abuses enables international actors concerned with poor working
conditions – governments, businesses, unions and human rights
organizations – to formulate strategies targeted at achieving
specific reforms feasible in the Chinese context. It enables them to
engage with sympathetic Chinese actors without ipso facto putting
those actors at risk. It may also enable them to directly improve the
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lives of the many exploited workers at the hub of world industrial
production.
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